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For much of our nation's history, the poor have faced pervasive discrimination in
the exercise offundamental rights. Nowhere has the impairment been more severe
than in the area ofprivacy. This Article considers the enduring legacy of this tradition
with respect to the Fourth Amendment right to domestic privacy. Farfrom a matter of
receding historical interest, the diminution of the poor's right to privacy has
accelerated in recent years and now represents a powerful theme within the
jurisprudence ofpoverty. Triggering this development has been a series of challenges
to aggressive administrative practices adopted by localities in the wake offederal
welfare-reform legislation. As a precondition to public assistance, some jurisdictions
now require that all applicants submit to a suspicionless home search by law-
enforcement investigators seeking evidence of welfare fraud. In turning back
challenges to these intrusions, contemporary courts have significantly curtailed the
protections of the Fourth Amendment as applied to the poor.
* Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center. Many thanks to my colleagues Sophie
Sparrow, Mitchell Simon, and Margaret McCabe for their helpful suggestions and comments,
and to my research assistants Peter Keane and Austin Padgett for the invaluable assistance that
they offered throughout this project. Thanks also to Dean John Hutson and Associate Dean
Susan Richey of the Franklin Pierce Law Center for their support and encouragement. Before
joining the faculty of Pierce Law, I served as Legal Director of the ACLU Foundation of San
Diego & Imperial Counties and in that capacity represented the plaintiff class in Sanchez v.
County of San Diego, one of the cases discussed below. In view of that earlier organizational
affiliation, I emphasize that the views expressed here are solely my own.
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While the courts that sanction these practices disclaim any sort ofpoverty-based
classification underlying their analysis, no other rationale withstands scrutiny. Neither
precedent nor the principled extension of existing doctrinejustifies recent outcomes or
explains why the holdings should not be applied to authorize a vast-and, thus,
unacceptable-expansion of suspicionless search practices directed at the homes of
the less destitute. The developingjurisprudence accordingly represents an implicit
concession that the poor constitute a subconstitutional class for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. Framed most charitably, the decisions understand poverty as a
condition of moral culpability and thus accept it as a surrogate for the individualized
suspicion that otherwise would be required to justify the intrusions at issue. The
premise of the dissolute poor, tracing back centuries, remains alive and well in
American law, and we have a bifurcated Fourth Amendment to prove its enduring
vitality.
"You have to watch every step like you are in prison. All the time you are on
welfare, yeah, you are in prison. Someone is watching like a guard.
INTRODUCTION
For much of our nation's history, the poor have faced pervasive discrimination in
the exercise of fundamental rights.2 Nowhere has the impairment been more severe
than in the area of privacy. 3 Acting with the acquiescence of a complicit judiciary, the
state has repeatedly exempted the poor from the full measure of privacy protections at
the core of our constitutional identity-most often through the imposition of highly
intrusive conditions upon the government's provision of subsistence aid or its
recognition of the custodial interests of indigent parents.4
1. JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMrrs
OF PRIVACY 1 (2001) (quoting "Mary, a forty-something mother of three, on welfare, in
Appalachian Ohio").
2. See, e.g., Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty
Law, Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 629-36 (2008);
William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteen States, 31 U. RICH.
L. REV. 111, 160 (1997) [hereinafter Quigley, Reluctant Charity] ("Needy persons [in the
original states] were paupers, and as such they forfeited all civil, political, and social rights.
They could be jailed, sold at auction, or indentured at the discretion of the individual towns or
communities."); James G. Wilson, Reconstructing Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to
Assist Impoverished Children, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 391, 402-15 (1990) (discussing judicial
reluctance to enforce interests of poor). See generally Ann M. Burkhart, The Constitutional
Underpinnings of Homelessness, 40 Hous. L. REV. 211, 215 (2003) ("The poor have been
largely disenfranchised and have been the subject of invidious discrimination.").
3. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1225,
1243 (1999) ("The history of aid to poor women is replete with attempts to control their lives by
making receipt of public welfare contingent on their compliance with morality requirements that
also involve state supervision of their lives."); Jonathan L. Hafetz, "A Man 's Home Is His
Castle? ": Reflections on the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and
Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 240-42 (2002).
4. See infra notes 51-93 and accompanying text.
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This Article considers the enduring legacy of this dark constitutional tradition with
respect to the privacy interest perhaps most celebrated in the popular and judicial
conception: the Fourth Amendment right to be secure in one's home absent good cause
for government intrusion. 5 Far from a matter of receding historical interest, the
diminution of the poor's Fourth Amendment right to domestic privacy has accelerated
in recent years and now represents a powerful theme within the jurisprudence of
poverty. Triggering this development has been a series of legal challenges to
increasingly aggressive administrative practices adopted by various localities in the
wake of federal welfare-reform legislation. 6 As a precondition to the provision of
public assistance, some jurisdictions now require that applicants submit to an
unannounced and suspicionless search oftheir homes by law-enforcement investigators
seeking evidence of welfare fraud-a practice that pushes far beyond the verification
requirements previously imposed on aid applicants.7 In turning back challenges to
these privacy intrusions, courts have significantly curtailed the protections of the
Fourth Amendment as applied to the poor.
While the courts that sanction these practices disclaim any sort of poverty-based
classification underlying their analysis, this Article argues that no other rationale
withstands scrutiny. Neither precedent nor the principled extension of existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine justifies recent outcomes or explains why those holdings should
not be applied to authorize a vast-and, thus, unacceptable-expansion of
suspicionless search practices directed at the homes of the less destitute. The
developing jurisprudence thus represents an implicit concession that the poor constitute
a subconstitutional class for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and a confirmation
that judicial bias continues to powerfully burden indigent litigants. Framed most
charitably, the decisions understand poverty as a condition of moral culpability and
thus accept it as a surrogate for the individualized suspicion of wrongdoing that
otherwise would be required to justify the intrusions at issue. The premise ofthe guilty
poor, tracing back centuries, remains very much alive and well in contemporary
American law.
The Article is divided into two parts. Part I reviews the two powerful and competing
themes at issue in the current debate over the permissibility of suspicionless home
searches of the poor: the sanctity of the home in our constitutional tradition, and the
contrasting historical exclusion of indigents from the full enjoyment of privacy rights at
the core of our national self-conception. After briefly examining the exalted status of
the home in American law and the long and competing history of state-sanctioned
intrusions upon the domestic privacy of the poor, the Article turns to the most recent
pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court on the subject-its 1971 decision
5. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core [of
the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion."); D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept,
46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 255,255 (2006) ("In the United States, home and home ownership are
held in high cultural esteem, as American as apple pie and baseball .... [W]e have developed
something of an ideology of home where the protection of home and all it stands for is an
American virtue.").
6. See infra notes 204-55 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 204-55 and accompanying text.
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in Wyman v. James,8 which sanctioned suspicionless home visits conducted by social
workers as a condition of welfare assistance. 9 Widely condemned by commentators and
characterized as a limited aberration, 0 Wyman has actually enlarged its reach over the
last three decades as lower courts have repeatedly invoked its rationale to justify
increasingly intrusive search practices targeting the homes of the poor."
Part II examines the contemporary jurisprudence endorsing the constitutionality of
aggressive search practices now being directed against the homes of welfare applicants.
The decisions rest on two primary rationales: first, that the Supreme Court's holding in
Wyman authorizes the practices, and, second, that the contemporary special-needs
doctrine independentlyjustifies the intrusions. Neither rationale is remotely persuasive.
The searches at issue reach far beyond the conduct authorized by Wyman-which itself
lacked any principled doctrinal basis to support the special burden it inflicted upon the
poor-and they lack virtually all the essential attributes of the relatively narrow class
of suspicionless searches sanctioned by the special-needs doctrine. In particular, the
searches at issue here are designed to advance a need that is not special in any respect:
the government's administrative interest in the fiscal integrity of a benefits program. If
the government is justified in searching, without suspicion, the home of every applicant
for public assistance simply to advance its mundane and general interest in preventing
the improper expenditure of some of its funds, then it necessarily is justified in
searching, again without suspicion, the home of every person claiming a benefit, tax
credit, or deduction that depends in part on representations about conditions within the
home. To state the proposition is to refute it.
In conclusion, the Article considers the implications of this jurisprudence in view of
the collapse of its stated rationales. Presuming that the decisions do not represent a new
and unparalleled doctrinal assault upon the constitutional protections afforded the
homes of virtually all persons-an untenable proposition, given the practical
impossibility of its implications-the conclusion is apparent that these cases instead lay
bare the dual and discriminatory nature of the contemporary Fourth Amendment. Quite
simply, the provision means two very different things, depending on the relative wealth
of the person seeking its protection. It is a distinction made explicable, if at all, by the
archaic notion that poverty reflects the personal culpability of those who endure it.
I. SELECTIVE SANCTITY: THE HOME, THE POOR, AND THE INTRUSIVE STATE
As John Gilliom notes, "'the poor' includes all races, colors, ethnicities, regions,
and ages of people, although it is heavy on women and children.... In short, those
who at some period of time populate the low end of the income distribution scale in the
United States are indescribably varied and multifaceted."' 12 While terms such as "the
poor" and "the indigent" thus refer to a "complex and unwieldy reality,"' 3 they
nevertheless identify a shared economic condition-low income coupled with scarce
material assets-that places individuals so described in a similar posture with respect
8. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
9. Id. at 326.
10. See infra notes 99-143 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 260-331 and accompanying text.
12. GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 20-21.
13. Id. at 20.
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to the state, particularly when the terms are understood to more narrowly focus on
persons in need of state assistance to meet subsistence needs. 14 So defined, "the poor"
identifies a class of individuals whose exercise of fundamental rights has been
significantly compromised by their relationship with the state.15
The particular focus of this Article is the restricted ability of these poor-
understood specifically to include persons in need of public assistance--4o exercise the
Fourth Amendment's celebrated right to privacy within the home. At the core of the
question are two conflicting narratives: the long and robust history of our right to
sanctuary within the "castle" of our homes, and the very different story of the poor's
enduring struggle against state-sanctioned intrusion. These themes collided in Wyman
v. James, a decision addressing the degree to which the poor sacrifice rights of
domestic privacy in exchange for public assistance. The Supreme Court's resolution of
the question embraced longstanding biases against the poor, ignored competing values
of domestic security, and set in motion a privacy jurisprudence that has grown
increasingly hostile over the intervening three decades.
A. The Special Status of the Home
The home holds a privileged position in the Anglo-American legal tradition.'
6
English law recognized over four centuries ago that "the house of every one is to him
as his.., castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for
his repose ... As James Otis summarized in his 1761 argument challenging the
legality of the Writs of Assistance, "one of the most essential branches of English
liberty is the freedom of one's house. A man's house is his castle; and whilst he is
quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle."'18 The doctrine, at least in its later
and perhaps idealized recounting, made no distinction between the rich and the poor,
as William Pitt famously underscored in a 1763 speech to Parliament:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
14. Cf DOUGLAS R. IMIG, POVERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF POOR
AMERICANS 2 (1996) ("The diversity of low-income Americans helps to explain the historical
paucity of political action by the poor. To act as a group, poor people would need to see
themselves as undergoing a common plight-yet they have little or no opportunity to recognize
the shared aspects of their condition.").
15. See infra notes 51-143 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ("The
common-law right of a man to privacy in his home [is] a right which is one of the indispensable
ultimate essentials of our concept of civilization. It was firmly established in the common law as
one of the bright features of the Anglo-Saxon contributions to human progress."), affdon other
grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
17. Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *223 ("[The law has] so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a
man's house that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity....").
18. James Otis, Speech in the Cause of the Writs of Assistance (1761), in WILLIAM TuDOR,
THE LIFE OF JAMES OTIS, OF MASSACHUSETrS 62, 66-67 (1823); quoted in Frank v. Maryland,




enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter---all his force dares
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement! 19
This principle "carried over with a nearly-sacred resolve to the American
colonies" 20 and powerfully informed the drafting of the United States Constitution.
2 1
The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, as
well as the Third Amendment's bar against the quartering of soldiers in private houses,
reflect a foundational commitment to the "fierce protection of the inner sanctum of the
home" 22 inherited from English law and bolstered by the colonists' bitter experience
with the intrusive practices of the English crown.23 Notably, the colonists' objection to
unreasonable search practices focused almost exclusively on the home; similar
complaints were not made with respect to other forms of property such as ships,
commercial establishments, and warehouses.24 The debates surrounding the ratification
of the Constitution reflected a similar focus.
25
This constitutional commitment took broader and more concrete form over the
course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the Court explicitly linked
the Fourth Amendment's protection of property rights with the privacy interests
affiliated with the home.26 In Boyd v. United States,27 decided in 1886, the Court
stressed that the Fourth Amendment "affect[s] the very essence of constitutional liberty
and security" and broadly applies "to all invasions on the part of the government and
its employrs of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of his life.,
28
Underscoring the reach of the provision, the Court declared:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right
of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has
never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence .... 29
Two decades later, in Weeks v. United States,3" the Supreme Court expanded the reach
of the Fourth Amendment in additional and important respects by constitutionalizing
the common law warrant requirement for home searches and by applying the
19. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (quoting William Pitt).
20. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1335, 1358.
21. See id. at 1358-59; Barros, supra note 5, at 265.
22. Gormley, supra note 20, at 1358.
23. Seeid. at 1358-59;see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,210(1961)(Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("Searches of the dwelling house were the special object of this universal
condemnation of official intrusion [embodied by the common law and the American
Constitution].").
24. Thomas Y. Davies, Rediscovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv.
547, 601-08 (1999).
25. Id. at 609.
26. Id. at 726; Gormley, supra note 20, at 1357-75; Hafetz, supra note 3, at 195.
27. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
28. Id. at 630.
29. Id.
30. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in violation of that requirement. 31 Weeks thus
firmly established the Fourth Amendment as "a broad protection of a right to be secure
in one's house and papers rather than as a simple ban against general warrants. 32
Within the last fifty years, the Court has further expanded the reach of the Fourth
Amendment by declaring that the provision protects people-not merely places-
based upon the individual's reasonable expectations of privacy.33 Under this doctrine,
the home continues to enjoy unique status based on the heightened expectation of
privacy that individuals reasonably possess within their dwelling 34 as well as a
continuing recognition of the historical fact that "the Fourth Amendment has drawn a
firm line at the entrance to the house." 35 Despite the Supreme Court's recent
diminution of Fourth Amendment protections in other contexts, 36 scores of
contemporary authorities confu-m the singular privacy protections enjoyed within the
home.37 As the Second Circuit recently noted, the Fourth Amendment's "ultimate
protection" applies in the home alone.38
As a consequence, the state faces significant constraints in breaching domestic
privacy to advance the objectives of either the criminal or civil law. Most familiar is
the requirement that the state ordinarily obtain a warrant issued on a showing of
probable cause prior to entering a home for purposes of making an arrest or searching
for evidence. 39 In the absence of a warrant and probable cause, the government may
not monitor activities within the home even by means as apparently unobtrusive as
31. Id. at 393, 398; Davies, supra note 24, at 729-30.
32. Davies, supra note 24, at 730-31; see also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-
06(1921).
33. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J.,
concurring); see also, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
34. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; see, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ("[I]t is beyond dispute that the home is entitled to special protection as the
center of the private lives of our people.").
35. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,590 (1980); see, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972).
36. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 197 passim (1993).
37. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006); Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27passim;
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 610; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980); Payton, 445 U.S. at 590;
Keith, 407 U.S. at 313; Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167,210 (1961); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301,306-07 (1958); United States
v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir. 2007); Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to
Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47
WM. & MARY L. REv. 413, 502 (2005) ("The law is clearest on official incursions into an
individual's home.").
38. United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2002); see, e.g., Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 n.21 (2001); Payton, 445 U.S. at 589 ("The Fourth Amendment
protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more
clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's
home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms .. "); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) ("[The sanctity of private dwellings [is]
ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.").
39. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 576; Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984).
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remote thermal imaging.40 Nor may the state ordinarily enter the home in the absence
of a warrant or its equivalent 4' to assure compliance with civil law obligations such as
housing, fire, or related public-safety regulations.42 Other constitutional protections,
such as the right of free expression, apply with special force as well:
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do
not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in
his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.
43
Conversely, the First Amendment provides diminished protection to speakers in public
forums who direct their speech toward private residences. 44 As the Supreme Court
noted in Frisby v. Schultz,
a special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls, which the
State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions. Thus, we have
repeatedly held that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into
their own homes and that the government may protect this freedom.
45
These authorities intuitively recognize that domestic privacy promotes interests that
are foundational to a free and secure society. Jerome Frank observed fifty years ago
that "[a] sane, decent, civilized society must provide some ... oasis, some shelter from
public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is
a man's castle. '46 As Colb explains,
For a person to be able to enjoy the exercise of her right to marry, to use birth
control, and to make parental decisions regarding her children's upbringing and
education, she must have a physically private space-a zone in which the
government may not acquire personal knowledge of her intimate life.
47
Empirical research and theoretical literature from the field of psychology corroborate
that the "oasis" of the home serves several highly significant emotional and social
functions that are crucial to psychological well-being.48 Separation from the home, or
unwanted intrusions upon it, pose serious psychological risks.49 In particular, by
40. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
41. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978).
42. See id. at 312-13; Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (search of
home); see also The Supreme Court, 1970 Term-Warrantless Home Visits to Welfare
Recipients, 85 HARv. L. REv. 258, 262 (1971) [hereinafter Warrantless Home Visits].
43. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
44. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,484-88 (1988); see, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 21 (1971); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
45. 487 U.S. at 484-85.
46. United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 3 15-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting).
47. Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension ofFourth Amendment "Reasonableness,"
98 COLUm. L. REV. 1642, 1705 (1998).
48. See Barros, supra note 5, at 276-80.
49. Id.at279n.110.
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creating secure space for the existence and development of the family, the home is
inextricably linked to the most important and highly protected social institution in our
culture.5
0
B. The Homes of the Poor: A Competing Narrative
The home and the family it shelters are sacrosanct in the rhetoric of our legal
tradition, but the historical application of domestic privacy principles has sharply
differentiated on grounds of class, race, and gender.5 ' In contrast to the overarching
commitment to the security of home and family celebrated by our legal and political
culture, the American poor have faced centuries of threats to familial integrity and
domestic privacy. While the historical intrusions upon the privacy of the poor are well
addressed elsewhere, 2 a brief review of the indigent's historically insecure claim to
home and family provides important context for the contemporary developments
discussed in Part II.
1. Paupers and the Poor Laws
Poverty was a prominent characteristic of the early American economy, 53 and
colonial America did not view its poor charitably. Then, as in the centuries to follow,
public opinion regarding the indigent turned largely on the enduring notion that
poverty among the able-bodied is a personal failing reflecting sloth, indolence, or some
related moral deficit.5 4 The premise, traceable to the English Poor Laws of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, found particularly strong expression in the
American colonies where laws regulating the poor "were molded by the religious belief
that economic status was a reflection of moral worth."55 Labeling the able-bodied poor
50. See, e.g., Gregoryv. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)
(stating that the home is "the sacred retreat to which families repair for their privacy and their
daily way of living"); Barros, supra note 5, at 272; Robin Morris Collin & Robert William
Collin, Are the Poor Entitled to Privacy?, 8 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 181, 191 (1991).
51. See Hafetz, supra note 3, at 240; William P. Quigley, The Quicksands ofthePoorLaw:
Poor ReliefLegislation in a Growing Nation 1790-1820, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 1, 88-93 (1997)
[hereinafter Quigley, Quicksands] (discussing race discrimination).
52. See, e.g., GILLIOM, supra note 1; MICHAELB. KATz, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE:
A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986); Hafetz, supra note 3.
53. See Burkhart, supra note 2, at 227 (recounting that up to 20% of the white population at
the time of the American Revolution lived in poverty while an additional 20% of the total
population was enslaved); id. at 217 (noting that England viewed America as "a dumping
ground for its most economically burdensome residents---criminals and the poor"); see also
William P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial America, 31 U.S.F. L.
REv. 35, 71-78 (1996) [hereinafter Quigley, Work or Starve].
54. See, e.g., William P. Quigley, Backwards into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the
Millennium Resemble English Poor Law of the Middle Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 101,
105-06 (1998) [hereinafter Quigley, Backwards]; Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 2, at
114; Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L. J.
1499, 1502-08 (1991).
55. Burkhart, supra note 2, at 221-22; see also Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 2, at
114 ("The themes of English poor law that continued to resonate in the earliest American poor
2010]
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as "paupers," religious leaders offered Americans a theological indictment of their
condition: "Pauperism," lectured one, "is the consequence of wilful error, of shameful
indolence, of vicious habits. It is a misery of human creation, the pernicious work of
man, the lamentable consequence of bad principles and morals.'56 Prominent Founders
endorsed the view: John Adams wrote that "very few men who have no property have
any judgment of their own," 57 while Benjamin Franklin argued against "encouragement
for laziness, and supports for folly" on grounds that "the order of God and Nature...
perhaps has appointed want and misery as the proper punishments for, and cautions
against, as well as necessary consequences of, idleness and extravagance." 58 In 1837,
the United States Supreme Court forthrightly embraced the sentiment in a decision
upholding a statute requiring passengers on arriving ships to report their occupation:
We think it as competent and as necessary for a state to provide precautionary
measures against the moral pestilence of paupers... as it is to guard against the
physical pestilence, which may arise from ... a ship, the crew of which may be
laboring under an infectious disease.
59
Reduced to the status of moral pestilence, the poor were broadly excluded from
economic and political rights in colonial America and the early United States. The
Articles of Confederation specifically excluded "paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives
from justice" from the privileges and immunities of citizenship. 60 Those in need of
public assistance "could be jailed, sold at auction, or indentured at the discretion of...
individual towns or communities.",6 1 Settlement laws barred the poor from moving to
new communities and empowered local officials to detain and return them to their prior
residences. 62 Begging, indebtedness, and the failure to become self-supporting were
crimes punishable by imprisonment or public whipping.63 Indentured servitude
persisted from the colonial era into the nineteenth century, 64 with two-thirds of
immigrants to some states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries arriving
as indentured laborers with vastly diminished legal and political rights.65 As late as the
early twentieth century, several states continued to deny paupers-typically defined to
include anyone receiving public assistance-the right to vote or hold public office.66
laws include [the treatment of poverty] not as an economic problem, but as an individual
failure....").
56. Ross, supra note 54, at 1505 (quoting Reverend Charles Burroughs, A Discourse
Delivered in the Chapel of the New Alms-House in Portsmouth, New Hampshire (1835)).
57. Burkhart, supra note 2, at 214 (quoting Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan
(May 26, 1776), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS at 367-77 (C. Adams ed., 1864)).
58. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Richard Jackson (May 5, 1753), in 3 THE WRITINGS
OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 135 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1905).
59. City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142-43 (1837).
60. ARTICLEs OF CONFEDERATION art. 4, § 1; see also Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra
note 2, at 176.
61. Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 2, at 160.
62. See id. at 140-50; Quigley, Quicksands, supra note 51, at 78-84.
63. See Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 2, at 160-69.
64. Burkhart, supra note 2, at 221.
65. See id. at 220-21; Quigley, Quicksands, supra note 51, at 87; Quigley, Work or Starve,
supra note 53, at 71-76.
66. Burkhart, supra note 2, at 256; Quigley, Quicksands, supra note 51, at 93-94.
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Against this backdrop of social condemnation and formal oppression, the growing
ranks of the poor in the early United States faced grave threats to domestic privacy and
familial security. 67 Proceeding from the premise that poverty-absent some
extenuating condition-was the fault of those who suffered it, early English and
American poor laws distinguished between the "deserving" (i.e., the physically or
mentally infirm) and the "undeserving" (i.e., the able-bodied) and typically excluded
the latter from aid.68 Able-bodied poor instead were expected to support themselves
and, if they failed to do so, faced harsh consequences including commitment to a
"workhouse," "house of correction," or debtor's prison.69 Following a parent's
incarceration as a debtor or pauper, the poor family often disintegrated: "Even a
debtor's children could be sold to pay the creditor.,
70
While the state offered aid rather than punishment to the "deserving" poor, its
assistance nonetheless reflected the shameful status of indigency and a belief that any
relief might create an unhealthy dependence upon it.71 Early poor laws thus were
designed to provide aid in a manner sufficiently unattractive to incentivize the needy to
seek it only in true desperation-often at the cost of home and family.72 As in England,
the American poor during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries faced
periodic demands that they abandon their dwellings and move to "poorhouses" or
"almshouses" in exchange for meager public relief.73 As an alternative to the
poorhouse, communities in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries commonly
removed the needy from their homes and placed them with private families who
received public funds to provide basic care and shelter in return for work.74 The
process often operated in a particularly humiliating fashion: in many localities, the poor
were literally auctioned off to the homeowners who submitted the lowest bids for their
care.
75
67. William P. Quigley, Five Hundred Years of English Poor Laws, 1349-1834:
Regulating the Working and Nonworking Poor, 30 AKRON L. REV. 73, 126-27 (1996)
[hereinafter Quigley, Five Hundred Years].
68. See, e.g., Quigley, Work or Starve, supra note 53, at 35, 42-45; Ross, supra note 54, at
1502-08; see also HERBERT J. GANs, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR 74-102 (1995) (discussing
contemporary application of principle); GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 22. Notably, early poor laws
typically stipulated that "deserving" recipients of aid must be white. Quigley, Quicksands, supra
note 51, at 54.
69. Burkhart, supra note 2, at 222-23; Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra note 2, at 160-69;
Quigley, Work or Starve, supra note 53, at 62-63.
70. Burkhart, supra note 2, at 223.
71. Quigley, Five Hundred Years, supra note 67, at 127.
72. Id. at 110; see also Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom of Contract,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 310 (1995); Quigley, Backwards, supra note 54, at 104-05; Quigley,
Reluctant Charity, supra note 2, at 114.
73. See Quigley, Quicksands, supra note 51, at 73-78; Quigley, Reluctant Charity, supra
note 2, at 156-60; William F. Quigley, Rumblings ofReform: Northern Poor ReliefLegislation
in Antebellum America, 1820-1860, 26 CAP. U. L. REv. 739, 768 (1997) [hereinafter Quigley,
Rumblings]; Quigley, Work or Starve, supra note 53, at 61-63.
74. See Quigley, Quicksands, supra note 51, at 69-73; Quigley, Rumblings, supra note 73,
at 756-57; Quigley, Work or Starve, supra note 53, at 61-62.
75. Burkhart, supra note 2, at 223-24.
2010]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
2. Unfit Homes and Friendly Visitors
Following the Civil War, "[u]rbanization, industrialization, and mass immigration
transformed the nation's landscape, sparking fears its homes and families were being
undermined and endangering the entire social order."1 6 In response to these perceived
perils, social reformers launched "countless experiments... in the nation's programs
for the poor"77 involving "extensive intervention into the homes and private lives of
[aid] recipients., 78 Child protection was an important focus of this interventionist zeal,
prompting aggressive efforts by public officials to remove children from "unfit homes"
for placement with foster families or orphanages. 79 As with the poor laws of previous
centuries, these new efforts rested on a belief that poor and immigrant parents
"lack[ed] ... the cardinal virtues of 'will, work ethic, thrift, responsibility, and
honesty'. 80 and thus must be separated from their children to thwart the corrupting
influence. 8' To accomplish this objective, the state and allied private charities
conducted "sweeping investigations of private homes that were fundamentally at odds
with the judicial exaltations of the home's sanctity in other settings," including such
practices as warrantless home searches, late-night and early-morning raids, and entry
through windows
82
In the early decades of the twentieth century, under the growing influence of
progressive reformers, the focus of child protection policies shifted from removal and
institutionalization to the provision of care within the home. This shift in focus,
however, did not result in any greater deference to the domestic privacy of the poor.
Instead, agents of the state continued to enter homes and search premises freely-now
to assess the needs of children and to closely supervise the provision of assistance to
their families.
84
The Progressive Era of the early twentieth century gave rise to another important
development in the provision of indigent assistance: the Mothers' Pensions, which laid
much of the groundwork for modem welfare administration.8 5 These programs,
designed to provide single mothers with closely supervised financial assistance,
incorporated the premise that the state should limit relief to the "deserving" poor based
on "[m]oralistic considerations, such as whether the recipient's children were
legitimate." 6 To determine recipients' worthiness and to assure that the poor properly
76. Hafetz, supra note 3, at 203.
77. GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 24; see also Hafetz, supra note 3, at 178.
78. Hafetz, supra note 3, at 178, 204-24.
79. See id. at 205-12.
80. Id. at 209 (quoting LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OwN LIvEs: THE POLIcs AND
HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, BOSTON 1880-1960, at 62 (1988)); see also KATZ, supra note
52, at 108.
81. Hafetz, supra note 3, at 207-08.
82. Id. at 208.
83. Id. at 213-14; Mark H. Leff, ConsensusforReform: The Mothers 'Pension Movement
in the Progressive Era, 47 Soc. SERv. REv. 397, 410 (1973).
84. Hafetz, supra note 3, at 214.
85. GiLLIOM, supra note 1, at 25.
86. Hafetz, supra note 3, at 217; see also Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat:
Constructing a New Ideology of Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REv. 415,420
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used their aid, Mothers' Pensions relied on an administrative method that continues to
characterize contemporary welfare relief: "the 'friendly visitor,' a prototype of the
modem social worker who would go into the homes of the poor to advise, inspect,
support, and instruct." 87 Among the primary tasks of the friendly visitor was to assure
that poor mothers maintained "suitable homes," a highly subjective norm that
empowered the state to inquire into virtually all aspects of a recipient's private life. 8
To assure the maintenance of suitable-home standards, visiting officials conducted
"midnight raids in search of male visitors, 8 9 barred male boarders, and even
prohibited evening dates.
90
With the onset of the Depression, as the federal government began to assume
responsibility for much of the poverty relief formerly provided by the Mothers'
Pensions, it carried forward the administrative concepts of the friendly visitor and
suitable home.91 As Gordon notes, "Home visits were the norm in casework at this time
.... [T]he assumption remained that a public assistance client was in need of
counseling and rehabilitation and had fewer privacy rights than others."92 For example,
in the decades following the Depression, many localities administering federal
programs imposed "man-in-the-house" prohibitions that empowered case workers to
make unannounced home visits in search of male companions.
93
As government subsidies, grants, and financial aid to other groups and individuals
proliferated during the twentieth century, the longstanding premise that the poor
sacrificed their right of privacy in exchange for public assistance stood in increasing
tension with the undiminished rights of others receiving government largesse.
94
Inevitably, the continuing use of home visits, late-night raids, and related surveillance
techniques through the 1950s and 1960s95 collided with the Fourth Amendment as
activists in the nascent welfare-rights movement sought to extend increasingly robust
protections against warrantless home searches96 to welfare recipients.97 In Wyman v.
(1999).
87. GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 24; see Hafetz, supra note 3, at 220 ("[A]dministering
officials.., considered regular home visits indispensible.").
88. GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 25; Hafetz, supra note 3, at 221.
89. GiLLIOM, supra note 1, at 25.
90. Hafetz, supra note 3, at 222-23.
91. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND TIHE HISTORY OF
WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 1-13, 37, 275-76 (1994); Brito, supra note 86, at 423; Betsy
Ledbetter Hancock & Leroy H. Pelton, Home Visits: History and Function, 70 J. CoNTEMP. Soc.
WORK 21 (1989).
92. GORDON, supra note 91, at 296; see GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 26 ("It was here, in the
program for women and children, that the most degrading and invasive tactics of modem
welfare would be seen.").
93. Brito, supra note 86, at 423; Hafetz, supra note 3, at 224-25; see also GILLIOM, supra
note 1, at 27.
94. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326-28 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); J.
Skelly Wright, Poverty, Minorities, and Respectfor Law, 1970 DUKE L.J. 425, 438.
95. GILLioM, supra note 1, at 31-32 ("Until the late 1960s, AFDC administrators in some
areas of the country had undertaken midnight or early-morning raids to see if an unreported
male was present in an allegedly single-parent home.").
96. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
97. Hafetz, supra note 3, at 226-27.
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James,98 the Supreme Court addressed the question and confirmed that the rhetoric of
domestic sanctity stopped at the doorstep of the indigent.
C. Wyman v. James: Resolving the Conflict in Favor of the State
The Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Wyman considered whether public officials
could condition welfare benefits upon the recipients' consent to periodic home visits by
caseworkers. 99 The Court began its discussion of the question by acknowledging the
home's special status in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:
When a case involves a home and some type of official intrusion into that home, as
this case appears to do, an immediate and natural reaction is one of concern about
Fourth Amendment rights and the protection which that Amendment is intended to
afford. Its emphasis indeed is upon one of the most precious aspects of personal
security in the home .... And over the years the Court consistently has been most
protective of the privacy of the dwelling. 100
Having acknowledged "[tihis natural and quite proper protective attitude," the Court
immediately declared that it was irrelevant to the case---"for the seemingly obvious and
simple reason that we are not concerned here with any search ... in the Fourth
Amendment meaning of that term."' 0 1 In a cursory passage, the Court asserted that
home visits fell outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment because of the
predominantly rehabilitative (as opposed to investigative) purpose of the caseworker's
visit and the fact that a visit, if any, occurred only by consent.'02 These rationales
attracted considerable criticism.'0 3 First, the Court itself had previously defined a
Fourth Amendment search in far more inclusive terms that captured virtually any
intrusion by state agents upon personal privacy'04  a standard that surely reached the
entry at issue in Wyman.'0 5 Second, the Court's focus on the rehabilitative purpose of
the visit conflicted with settled precedent establishing that the objective of the state's
intrusion, and the civil or criminal consequences (if any) that follow, are irrelevant to
the initial determination of whether the entry falls within the ambit of Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. 10 6 Finally, the Court's discussion of consent made no sense: free
98. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
99. Id. at310.
100. Id. at316.
101. Id. at 317.
102. Id. at 317-18.
103. See Robert A. Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact of
Wyman v. James, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1259, 1302-03 (1971); Warrantless Home Visits, supra
note 42, at 259-61; see also 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIzuRE: A TREATISE ON THE
FouRTH AMENDMENT § 10.3(a) (4th ed. 2004) ("[T]he Court is unquestionably incorrect in its
assertion that a home visit is not a search."); Ginny Kim, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions: Is
the Fourth Amendment for Sale in Public Housing?, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 180-84 (1995).
104. See, e.g., Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n.15 (1968).
105. Warrantless Home Visits, supra note 42, at 260 (stating that the nature of the entries at
issue in Wyman "provide[s] strong support for viewing the home visits as searches within the
Court's previous definition").
106. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 226 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting);
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and voluntary consent serves to validate-not eliminate-a Fourth Amendment
search. 107
As an alternative ground, the Court held that the visit, even if construed as a search
under the Fourth Amendment, was reasonable and thus permissible based on the
balance of relevant interests.10 8 Since the visit at issue involved neither a warrant nor
any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the Court's ruling in this respect withheld
from welfare recipients virtually all of the procedural and substantive protections
available under the Fourth Amendment. 0 9 In support of its conclusion, the Court
recited an "ad hoc"" 0 array of reasonableness factors that variously ignored or
misconstrued precedent,' trivialized the intrusive and often adversarial nature of the
caseworker's presence within the home, 1 2 and stigmatized poor parents based on
archaic stereotypes."l
3
The Court's reasonableness analysis placed significant emphasis on the fact that no
criminal sanctions attended the refusal to authorize a home visit-instead, aid simply
ceased." 4 The Court asserted that this consideration distinguished the case from earlier
and more protective decisions involving civil searches, such as Camara v. Municipal
Court" 5 and See v. City of Seattle, 1 6 in which criminal sanctions might have resulted
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
107. Cf Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (affirming that "a search
conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible"). The Wyman Court did
not discuss consent in the portion of its analysis that assumed, arguendo, that the proposed home
visits would constitute a search-presumably becausc Mrs. James had refused entry and
therefore rendered the defense irrelevant in her particular case. The question remains, however,
whether recipients who do consent to home visits on the terms at issue would effectively waive
their Fourth Amendment rights. The question turns on whether such consent is free and
voluntary. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227; Camara, 387 U.S. at 528. Considering the
consequences faced by a recipient who withholds consent, the context is powerfully coercive:
"What greater inhibition to freedom can there be than that which a welfare recipient faces when
subjected to a threat by the authorities to eliminate her sole means of providing food, shelter and
clothing for her family? This is coercion in its purest form." Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp.
1218, 1226 (D. Minn. 1979); cf Wyman, 400 U.S. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that
a recipient who withholds consent terminates "the sole means of support" for herself and her
children); see also infra, note 257.
108. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318-26.
109. Id. at 326; see 5 LAFAVE, supra note 103, § 10.3(a) (noting that a warrant requirement
in this context would "afford[] some protection against arbitrary searches and does not 'leave
the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field"' (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at
532)); Colb, supra note 47, at 1718-19.
110. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[I]n determining whether a search
is reasonable, this Court is not free merely to balance, in a totally ad hoc fashion, any number of
subjective factors."); see Warrantless Home Visits, supra note 42, at 262 ("[Flailing to attach
any weight to the factors... will leave lower courts in a quandary when they attempt to decide
whether other noncriminal intrusions into the home require prior resort to the warrant.").
11. See, e.g., 5 LAFAVE, supra note 103, § 10.3(a) (observing that the Court's argument
against the warrant requirement "is difficult to take... seriously" in view of prior precedent).
112. Colb, supra note 47, at 1720-22.
113. Ross, supra note 54, at 1523-25.
114. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 321, 323-25.
115. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
116. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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from the refusal to permit an administrative home inspection. 117 The argument,
however, turned those decisions on their head. The entire thrust of Camara and See
was to discard the civil-criminal distinction for purposes of assessing the applicability
of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and to overrule prior authority-
specifically, Frank v. Maryland' 1s-to the contrary.1 9 LaFave thus observes that the
Wyman Court's argument rested on "[p]recisely the unsound premise of the earlier
Frank case which was rejected by the Court in Camara."120 Yet even if the distinction
were relevant, Justice Marshall explained in dissent that it provided little support for
the majority's conclusion in Wyman:
Even if the magnitude of the penalty were relevant, which sanction for resisting
the search is more severe? For protecting the privacy of her home, Mrs. James lost
the sole means of support for herself and her infant son. For protecting the privacy
of his commercial warehouse, Mr. See received a $100 suspended fine.' 2
The Court also asserted that the state's interest in assuring the fiscal integrity of the
public assistance program supported the reasonableness of the challenged searches.'
22
Noting that "tax funds provided from federal as well as from state sources" supported
the relief at issue, the Court recognized a "paramount interest and concern in seeing
and assuring that the intended and proper objects of that tax-produced assistance are
the ones who benefit from the aid it dispenses."' 123 "The public," the Court opined,
"[rightly] expects to know how [its] charitable funds are utilized and put to work.', 12
4
The reach of this argument obviously extends much further than the Court
acknowledged, since the state has precisely the same interest in the fiscal integrity and
administration of virtually any subsidy, grant, tax credit, deduction, or other form of
public aid. If the recipients of such aid-truly, nearly every person in the country-
were understood to have sacrificed their Fourth Amendment rights to the extent
required for the government to assure that the aid in question benefited only the
"intended and proper objects of that tax-produced assistance," '125 "the cries of
constitutional outrage would be unanimous." 2 6 The Court evidently sought to avert
such a construction by restricting its analysis to public "charity,"' 27 a term that merely
isolates a particular class of aid recipients-the poor-for the special burdens that the
Court imposed.
117. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 324-25.
118. 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled by Camara, 387 U.S. 523.
119. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530; see, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13
(1978) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches protects against
warrantless intrusions during civil as well as criminal investigations.").
120. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMiNAL
PROCEDURE § 3.9(d), at 364 n.63 (3d ed. 2007).





126. Id. at 343 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 319.
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Another factor heavily relied upon by the Wyman Court was the caseworker's
purportedly trusting and supportive relationship with the recipient and the unobtrusive
nature of the home entry itself. Evoking the mythic "friendly visitor" of the nineteenth
century, 128 the Court declared that the caseworker was not an adversarial "sleuth but
rather, we trust .... a friend to one in need." 129 The decision repeatedly returned to the
"rehabilitative" and "personal" nature of the visit, coupled with the absence of
"forcible entry or entry under false pretenses or visitation outside working hours or
snooping in the home,"' 30 and on that basis asserted that the intrusive dimension of the
search was trivial.' 3 ' This analysis notably omitted two central considerations: first,
that the "friendly" visit was an involuntary entry into the home of the aid recipient--the
paramount zone of privacy that, in other contexts, the Court had repeatedly
acknowledged to be sacrosanct; 32 and, second, that the presence of a caseworker was
inherently intrusive and disruptive of the family's autonomy, irrespective of the
absence of any "impolite or reprehensible conduct. 1 33 As Colb explains, "Because the
social worker does not participate in rearing the child, he might be unable to gauge
when it is or is not appropriate to interfere with what the mother has chosen to do. As
the mother's judge, rather than her colleague, his very presence is likely to undermine
the mother's authority in her home.' 34 Notably, the Court's effort in this regard to
depict the visits as "personal" and "rehabilitative" conspicuously ignored that the
caseworker was required to initiate a criminal investigation if anything observed within
the home raised suspicions of fraud.
135
Completing the Court's reasonableness analysis was a factor squarely at odds with
the preceding proposition. In emphasizing the state's "paramount" interest in entering
the home, the Court shifted away from the conception of a gentle and helpful
caseworker to the need for investigative scrutiny of the residence to assure the
protection of the children within. 136 Here the Court turned its attention to adult
recipients and rendered a depiction of them in the long tradition of the morally bereft
poor. 137 Indigent children, we are told, require protection from "possible
exploitation"'138 at the hands of their avaricious parents, who otherwise might divert aid
to satisfy their own desires:
The public's interest in this particular segment of the area of assistance to the
unfortunate is protection and aid for the dependent child whose family requires
128. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
129. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 323.
130. Id. at 321.
131. See id. at 317, 319-21.
132. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text; see also Coleman, supra note 37, at
506.
133. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 321.
134. Colb, supra note 47, at 1721; accord, Calm, supra note 3, at 1242-43. The record in
Wyman itself belied the image of a benevolent caseworker who entered without adversarial
intent to assist the recipient. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 339-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 339-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 318-19; see id. at 344 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Throughout its opinion, the
majority alternates between two views of the State's interest in requiring the home visit.").
137. See supra notes 54-59, 80-81 and accompanying text.
138. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 319.
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such aid for that child. The focus is on the child and, further, it is on the child who
is dependent .... The dependent child's needs are paramount, and only with
hesitancy would we relegate those needs, in the scale of comparative values, to a
position secondary to what the mother claims as her rights.1
39
Ross concludes that the Court thus "placed the state and the child in opposition to the
mother," an alignment that "depends on the assumption of a propensity of the mother
to act contrary to the interests of her children."
'1 40
To corroborate this asserted need for investigative scrutiny, the Court turned to Mrs.
James herself-despite the fact that the case involved a challenge to the defendant's
general search practices, which operated without suspicion of or regard for the
plaintiff's particular conduct-and suggested that she was precisely the kind of abusive
and immoral parent who demonstrated the need to intrude upon the homes of the poor.
"We have examined Mrs. James' case record," the Court observed, and
[it] is revealing as to [her] failure ever really to satisfy the requirements for
eligibility; as to constant and repeated demands; as to attitude toward the
caseworker; as to reluctance to cooperate; as to evasiveness; and as to occasional
belligerency. There are indications that all was not always well with the infant
Maurice .... The picture is a sad and unhappy one.
4 1
The Court's premise of the immoral poor, now corroborated and embodied by an
anecdotal caricature of Mrs. James herself, supplied the state with the necessary
interest to exempt all indigent parents from otherwise applicable constitutional
protections. "The story of Mrs. James and the infant Maurice becomes a story of all
AFDC mothers and their propensity, by virtue of their poverty, to abuse their
children., 142 By imputing to impoverished parents this universal risk of misconduct,
Wyman implicitly transformed the suspicionless home searches at issue into the sort of
cause-based investigative entries traditionally associated with the protections of the
Fourth Amendment. Supplanting the need for individualized suspicion, the recurring
premise of the immoral poor opened the doors of Mrs. James's home for the protection
of her child.
139. Id. at 318 (emphasis omitted).
140. Ross, supra note 54, at 1523-24; see also Wyman, 400 U.S. at 342 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]s this Court prepared to hold as a matter of constitutional law that a mother,
merely because she is poor, is substantially more likely to injure or exploit her children?");
Colb, supra note 47, at 1716.
141. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 322 n.9. Of course, this account uncritically credits the objectivity
of the reporting caseworker. Here, as elsewhere, there are likely two sides to the story. The
agency's characterization of Mrs. James as "reluctan[t] to cooperate," "evasive[]," and
"occasional[ly] belligeren[t]," id., could alternatively reflect her legitimate if unwelcome
resistance to its exercise of arbitrary authority. In any event, the record was amenable to a quite
different construction: "The record shows that Mrs. James has offered to be interviewed
anywhere other than her home, to answer any questions, and to provide any documentation that
the welfare agency desires. The agency curtly refused all these offers and insisted on its 'right'
to pry into appellee's home." Id. at 343 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. Ross, supra note 54, at 1525.
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Wyman's enumerated factors-the noncriminal nature of the visit, the state's
interest in fiscal integrity, the helpful attitude of the caseworker, and the posited threat
to the welfare of all poor children-offered virtually no doctrinal support for the
conclusion that the visits at issue constituted either no search at all or, alternatively, a
permissible entry in the absence of a warrant or suspicion. The very weakness of the
formal analysis raises the question whether the Court was engaged in a fundamentally
different sort of discourse. Much of the opinion reads less like constitutional
adjudication than a parental lecture: a benevolent patriarch imposes upon a wayward
child "a gentle means, of limited extent and of practical and considerate application,"
to assure that she properly spends an allowance. 143 The implicit message is that the
poor stand apart for purposes of rights enforcement. By virtue of their moral infirmity,
coupled with their indebtedness to the state for its support, the indigent approach the
Court not as litigants but as supplicants in hopes of dispensation. The task is not to
determine constitutional entitlement but rather to judge a plea for indulgence, which
the Court in Wyman deemed unworthy.
II. ABANDONING PRETENSE: THE CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF WYMAN
As an affirmation of longstanding bias and an implicit declaration that the poor are
simply different for purposes of constitutional analysis, Wyman challenged the lower
courts to define its reach. Should the ruling herald a new era of retrenchment in the
poor's struggle for equal justice, or should it instead be cast as an outlier-a decision
so poorly reasoned and at odds with allied precedent that its holding must be limited to
the narrowest plausible construction?
In the 1970s and 1980s, a handful of lower courts embraced the latter view.' 
44
Asserting that the Wyman Court "emphasized the peculiar factual situation of the case"
and noting the inconsistency of its reasoning with other Fourth Amendment precedents,
the D.C. Circuit concluded in 1975 that the Supreme Court had "limited Wyman to its
particular factual context."' 145 In 1979, a district court declined to apply Wyman to
search practices utilized by a mobile unit of caseworkers who visited the homes of
recipients accused of welfare fraud. 146 The court noted that "[t]he majority opinion in
Wyman v. James is not without conceptual problems, and, in view of the vigorous,
persuasive three-judge dissenting opinions, the holding must be restricted to the
boundaries imposed by the facts to avoid glaring inconsistency with prior search and
seizure cases.' ' 147 Another district court echoed the conclusion in a 1988 decision
143. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 319; see also id. at 321-22 ("What Mrs. James appears to want
from the agency that provides her and her infant son with the necessities for life is the right to
receive those necessities upon her own informational terms, to utilize the Fourth Amendment as
a wedge for imposing those terms, and to avoid questions of any kind.").
144. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 632 n.94 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Blackwelder v.
Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 140-41 (N.D.N.Y. 1988); Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218,
1224 (D. Minn. 1979); cf Walsh v. Erie County Dep't of Job and Family Servs., 240 F. Supp.
2d. 731, 746 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
145. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 633 n.94.




declining to extend Wyman to on-site observations of homeschooled students. 148
Noting that the inspections under review were "analogous" to several key features of
the Wyman visits, the court nonetheless concluded that Wyman "seems inconsistent
with prevailing fourth amendment analysis, and the precedential effect of Wyman
probably should be limited to the specific facts of that case."'
49
Other courts, while not expressing doubt regarding the force of the precedent, have
declined to extend it in related areas. 5 ° The topic most frequently addressed in this
context has been the permissibility of warrantless search practices in child abuse and
neglect investigations. 15' Despite the relationship of Wyman and its rationale to the
challenged policies,' 52 most federal courts have declined to uphold the searches-most
often because of the potential criminal implications of a child-abuse finding.153 As one
148. Blackwelder, 689 F. Supp. at 140-41.
149. Id. at 140; see also id. at 138 ("Though defendants accurately observe that the sort of
home visits contemplated by the school superintendents in the case at bar are similar in a
number of relevant respects to the visitations at issue in Wyman, the court declines to follow
Wyman's narrow conception of the scope of the fourth amendment, largely because it is
inconsistent with the weight of Supreme Court precedent."). But see United States v. Cogwell,
486 F.2d 823, 835-37 (7th Cir. 1973) (applying the Wyman rationale to justify warrantless
police visits to job-training centers to investigate possible fraud); cf Lovvom v. City of
Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1553-54 (6th Cir. 1988) (Guy, J., dissenting) (citing the Wyman
rationale in dissent as justification for suspicionless drug testing), reh "g granted, judgment
vacated en banc, 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988) (upholding practice without reference to
Wyman).
150. See, e.g., Rosen v. Hursh, 464 F.2d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 1972) (declining to extend
Wyman to justify income verification rules); de la O v. Arnold-Williams, No. CV-04-0192-EFS,
2006 WL 3761335, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 20, 2006) (declining to extend Wyman to searches of
in-home day care facilities); Bowser v. Blair County Children and Youth Serv., 346 F. Supp. 2d
788, 800-01 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (declining to extend Wyman to invasion ofprivacy claim based on
presence of third-parties accompanying social worker during home visit).
151. These arguments have relied both on Wyman and on the "special needs" doctrine.
Decisions expressly rejecting the applicability of Wyman include: Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d
808, 816 (9th Cir. 1999); Walsh v. Erie County Department ofJob and Family Services, 240 F.
Supp. 2d 731, 745-46 (N.D. Ohio 2003); and Lopkoffv. Slater, 898 F. Supp. 767, 773 (D. Colo.
1995), aftd, 103 F.3d 144 (10th Cir. 1996). Cases reaching the same outcome based on a
special-needs analysis include: Good v. Dauphin County Social Services for Children and
Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092-96 (3d Cir. 1989); White ex rel. White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d
812, 815 (9th Cir. 1986); and Franz v. Lytle, 791 F. Supp. 827, 830-31 (D. Kan. 1992), affd,
997 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1993).
152. Cf Mark Hardin, Legal Barriers in Child Abuse Investigations: State Powers and
Individual Rights, 63 WASH. L. REv. 493, 523 (1988) (noting that Wyman's focus on "the
rehabilitative character of welfare home visits and the need to protect dependent children...
may offer some support for a relaxed evidentiary standard governing searches pursuant to child
abuse investigations").
153. See supra note 151; cf Hardin, supra note 152, at 523, 538. But see Wildauer v.
Frederick County, 993 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 1993); Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 902
(7th Cir. 1986), affg E.Z. v. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546,1555 (N.D. Ill. 1985), andaffg in part,
vacating in part Darryl H. v. Coler, 585 F. Supp. 383, 389-90 (N.D. Il. 1984). See generally
Roe v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 403-05 (5th Cir. 2002)
(noting circuit split); Coleman, supra note 37, at 471-76 (noting that of the eight circuits to
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district court explained, "To accept the defendants' claims about the reach of Wyman
would give the state unfettered and absolute authority to enter private homes and
disrupt the tranquility of family life on nothing more than an anonymous rumor that
something might be amiss.,
154
Judicial reluctance to extend the reach of Wyman has only gone so far, however,
and is least evident when the targets of intrusion are exclusively poor. Accordingly,
within the classic context of welfare administration, the courts have shown little
restraint in embracing and enlarging the precedent.' 55 In considering challenges to new
and highly intrusive administrative practices arising out of the welfare-reform
movement of the 1980s and 1990s, lower courts have not merely conformed to
Wyman's analysis but aggressively extended its reasoning beyond the scope of the
original ruling--consigning aid applicants to unannounced and exhaustive searches of
their bedrooms, bathrooms, drawers, and closets by law-enforcement officers looking
exclusively for evidence of ineligibility or fraud.156 In sanctioning these extraordinarily
invasive practices in the absence of a warrant or suspicion of wrongdoing, the courts
have abandoned any credible pretense of addressing the Fourth Amendment rights of
the poor on shared terms with others.
A. Back to the Future: Welfare Reform and the Intrusive State
1. Ending Welfare as We Know It
From the inception of the Aid to Dependent Children program in the early 1930s
through the postwar period, federal welfare administration focused on a discretionary
social work model that emphasized the exercise of subjective judgment by caseworkers
in determining the provision of aid.' 57 Suitable home assessments and other judgments
about the worthiness of recipients required social workers during this period to closely
monitor poor families, thus "necessitating home visits and other means of
surveillance."' 58 During the 1960s, a number of constituencies converged to challenge
this model.' 59 Reacting to the perceived bias and inconsistency resulting from the
exercise of broad discretion, as well as a sense that the model inappropriately intruded
consider the question, only two have rejected application of the warrant and probable-cause
requirement to homes searches used in the investigation of alleged child abuse).
154. Walsh, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 746. This conclusion, however, has not been universally
embraced. A district court in Illinois, for example, relied on Wyman to conclude that a
warrantless strip search of suspected abuse victims neither implicated the Fourth Amendment
nor was unreasonable in the absence of probable cause. Darryl H., 585 F. Supp. at 389-90; see
also E.Z., 603 F. Supp. at 1558-59.
155. See infra Part II.B.I.
156. See infra Part II.B. 1; see also, e.g., Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916 (9th
Cir. 2006).
157. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1121, 1135-37 (2000).
158. Id. at 1136; see also supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
159. See GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 28-29 (referring to "urban militancy, relatively
progressive national leadership and local administration, litigation and advocacy by progressive




upon the privacy and dignity of the poor, 16 policy makers responded by shifting
toward a more formal, rules-based methodology for the determination of eligibility and
benefits.
16 1
The result, as Diller describes, was a "welfare system [that] operated through a
legal-bureaucratic model. Under this model, administrators dispensed benefits in
accordance with a fixed set of generally applicable rules. Recipients had a legal
entitlement to receipt of benefits and could challenge adverse decisions both
administratively and in court.''162 The new model, based on "a view of poverty that
focuses on structural economic issues, rather than individual failings,' ' 63 stressed the
concept of entitlement-"the idea that recipients have a right to benefits when they
meet specified eligibility criteria ' 1 64 and featured "a message that people in poverty
can manage their own lives."' 65 A dramatic reduction in the surveillance and
monitoring of aid recipients accompanied these changes. 166 As Gilliom notes, "The
level of suspicion, hassle, and investigations dropped as program administrators placed
greater emphasis on accepting the terms and condition of poor people's needs as they
were presented by the poor themselves." 167 Thus, just as the Supreme Court sanctioned
the use of home visits in its 1971 decision in Wyman, events ironically overtook the
litigation and rendered the procedure and related administrative practices largely
irrelevant.'
68
These changes, however, did not last long. The "welfare reform" movement that
began during the Reagan presidency' 69 and culminated with the passage of
transformative federal legislation in 1996170 challenged the entitlement model of
welfare administration as a naive and counterproductive experiment that made benefits
too easy to obtain, too generous, and too difficult to terminate-thus exacerbating
rather than alleviating poverty by creating a culture of indolence and dependency
among the poor.' 7 1 In support of this critique, proponents of reform repeatedly
160. See Diller, supra note 157, at 1136-37, 1143-45; GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 28.
161. See Diller, supra note 157, at 1137; see also GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 29.
162. Diller, supra note 157, at 1126.
163. Id. at 1144.
164. Id,
165. Id. at 1145.
166. See GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 28-29.
167. Id. at 28; see also Susan D. Bennett, "No Relief but Upon the Terms of Coming into the
House "-Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness in an Urban Shelter
System, 104 YALE L.J. 2157, 2184 (1995) (describing an "astonishing burst of regulatory
liberalization").
168. See GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 28.
169. See, e.g., IMIG, supra note 14, at 2.
170. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
171. See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a
Community-Based Welfare System, 66 U. Prrr. L. REv. 721, 745 (2005) ("In the 1980s,
conservative critics of welfare ... claimed that welfare induced laziness, dependency,
promiscuity, immorality, and deviancy among recipients."); Lucie E. White, No Exit:Rethinking
"Welfare Dependency"from a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1964 (1993) ("In the early
1980s, conservative scholars rediscovered the myth that welfare causes persistent poverty and
represented it as a serious policy claim."); see also James W. Fox, Jr., Liberalism, Democratic
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conjured the image of the welfare queen first mythologized by President Reagan, 72 to
make the case for dramatic change:
[W]e're not talking about characters out of some Steinbeck novel here.... These
recipients... are flesh and blood women who have become addicted to support
that allows them to lead counter-productive lives as parasites of the state. Unlike
the poor of the American Depression, they have no work ethic to pass on to their
children and their lives are marked with disorder, self indulgence, and sloth.
173
The depiction of the aid recipient as a champagne-sipping, Cadillac-driving mother of
droves' 74 was surreally disconnected from reality175 but powerfully evocative of earlier
conceptions of the poor: morally defective, indolent, and addicted to the enervating
largesse of public assistance that freed the recipient from honest labor. 76 Many of the
tenets underlying President Clinton's pledge to "end welfare as we know it"1 77 were
thus familiar to students of the early poor laws: poverty is not a social or economic
phenomenon but rather an individual failing; aid to the poor risks an unhealthy
dependence upon it, so government must offer assistance parsimoniously; and the
children of the poor are inherently at risk due to the infirmity of their parents.'
78
Citizenship, and Welfare Reform: The Troubling Case of Workfare, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 103, 109
(1996) ("The true failing of the current welfare system, according to its critics, is not just that it
perpetuates poverty, but that it breeds a non-work mentality among the underclass which
incapacitates them and excludes them from social citizenship.").
172. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Democracy, Race, and Multiculturalism in the Twenty-
First Century: Will the Voting Rights Act Ever Be Obsolete?, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 71,
94 (2006) ("On the campaign stump Reagan railed against the 'welfare queen' in Chicago who
reportedly had 'eighty names, thirty addresses, twelve social security cards' and tax free income
of 'over one hundred and fifty thousand dollars."'); Peter Edelman, The World After Katrina:
Eyes Wide Shut?, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 3-4 (2007) ("The backlash politics of
welfare cut its teeth on the residents of inner-city America. For most of his listeners, Ronald
Reagan's 'story' of the 'welfare queen' who drove to the grocery store in her white Cadillac to
buy the best steak with her food stamps evoked an image of an African American inner-city
single mother probably living in a public housing project.").
173. VIvYAN ADAIR, FROM GOOD MA TO WELFARE QUEEN: A GENEALOGY OF THE POOR
WOMAN IN AMERICAN LITERATURE, PHOTOGRAPHY, AND CULTURE 33 (2000) (quoting Tommy
Thompson, Speech at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (Sept. 1995)); see also White,
supra note 171, at 1962 n.3 (discussing Wisconsin's early experiments in welfare reform).
174. See, e.g., GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 30-31; DAVID ZUCCH1NO, THE MYTH OF THE
WELFARE QUEEN: A PULITZER PRIZE-WINNING JOURNALIST'S PORTRAIT OF WOMEN ON THE LINE
13 (1997); April Land, Children in Poverty: In Search of State and Federal Constitutional
Protections in the Wake of Welfare "Reforms, " 2000 UTAH L. REV. 779, 811; supra note 172.
175. See, e.g., ZUCCHINO, supra note 174, at 13-14; Gilman, supra note 171, at 746-50; cf
ZUCCHINO, supra note 174, at 65 ("Reagan was referring to a forty-seven-year-old Chicago
woman named Linda Taylor, who had indeed been charged with welfare fraud. But reporters
who looked into the case that year found that Reagan had lavishly embellished a tale of petty
fraud. Taylor was charged with defrauding the state of $8,000, not $150,000. She was charged
with using four aliases, not eighty.").
176. See, e.g., Quigley, Backwards, supra note 54, at 103-07.
177. Remarks on Welfare Reform in Kansas City, Missouri, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1075, 1076 (June
14, 1994).
178. See, e.g., Quigley, Backwards, supra note 54, at 101; see also Gilman, supra note 171,
2010]
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By the mid-1990s, these principles enjoyed broad currency among legislators and
policy makers of both major parties. 179 With the political establishment largely allied
against the poor in its judgment that strong medicine was required to end the posited
culture of personal irresponsibility and intergenerational welfare dependence,
180
Congress enacted sweeping changes to public assistance policy.' 81 The new legislation
eliminated Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the prior federal
entitlement program, and replaced it with a block-grant program to the states known as
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). 182 TANF, in turn, "grants
substantial flexibility to states to determine how to administer" federal welfare funds,
"explicitly ends the entitlement status of assistance for needy children and families,
imposes comprehensive work requirements, and initiates a five year lifetime limit on
those seeking assistance." 183 The overarching objective of TANF is to dramatically
reduce the number of individuals receiving public assistance by moving them into the
workforce. 184
The primary measure of success under the new legislation is caseload reduction,'
85
and the statutory scheme establishes significant incentives to achieve that outcome. 1
86
"[S]tates are given fixed block grants, which give them increased financial stakes in
reducing their caseloads. States with increasing caseloads simply cannot turn to the
federal government for more aid. States with declining caseloads end up with a
windfall of federal dollars."'' 87 In many states, the same incentive structure applies at
the local level; California, for example, provides a block grant to local entities
administering TANF and allows them to keep whatever sum is not spent on benefits.1
88
As a result, caseworkers face insistent demands to move recipients into any available
job--"[a]pparently, the pay cannot be too low, the hours too irregular, or the commute
too far to make a job unsuitable."' 189
These and related changes "have made assistance for poor people much more
difficult to secure and, if secured, much more difficult to retain."' 90 In the four years
at 724-25 ("The theoretical underpinning of [welfare reform] is that personal character flaws
cause poverty."); Hafetz, supra note 3, at 227-28; White, supra note 171, at 1963.
179. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 171, at 103; cf Gilman, supra note 171, at 741; White, supra
note 171, at 1963.
180. See Peter S. Goodman, From Welfare Shift in '96, a Reminderfor Clinton, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 11, 2008, at A1; Robert Pear, Clinton to Sign Welfare Bill That Ends U.S. Aid Guarantee
and Gives States Broad Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A l; see also Gilman, supra note
171, at 741.
181. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
182. Land, supra note 174, at 781-83. See generally Quigley, Backwards, supra note 54, at
101-02.
183. Quigley, Backwards, supra note 54, at 102; see also Diller, supra note 157, at 1146.
184. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)-(b) (2006); Diller, supra note 157, at 1183-84.
185. Diller, supra note 157, at 1183.
186. Id. at 1178-80.
187. Id. at 1178.
188. id. at 1180.
189. Id. at 1171; see also id. at 1184 ("The goal is to get recipients off benefits and into jobs,
with little concern about the quality of the jobs, the overall change in incomes, or the well-being
of recipients.").
190. Quigley, Backwards, supra note 54, at 102; see also Diller, supra note 157, at 1179
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following enactment of TANF, the number of individuals receiving federally funded
welfare assistance declined by nearly 50%.191 Poverty, however, continues unabated.1
92
As Gilman summarizes, "the actual living situations of most current and former welfare
recipients are bleak, because most people who leave welfare remain below the poverty
line, while others are unemployed and disconnected from the welfare system."'
' 93
Facing relentless pressure to move off the welfare rolls, TANF recipients often
transition into low-wage jobs with few benefits and face increased expenditures for
child care, transportation, medical care, and related expenses, while others who do not
secure employment simply "disappear from the system."' 194 A telling measure of the
impact of a national poverty strategy focused on caseload reduction is the fact that
approximately half of all families who are eligible for assistance under TANF do not
receive it.'95
2. Home Visits in the New Regime
An important element ofthis massive restructuring effort has been the devolution of
discretionary responsibility to local officials' 96 -- again, in keeping with poor relief of
previous centuries.'9 7 In view of the statutory focus on caseload reduction, localities
have devoted significant attention to reducing the number of recipients at the front-end
by imposing stringent and frequently demeaning verification procedures governing
applications for aid.' 98 As Mulzer explains, "In the hands of 'goal-oriented' welfare
agencies, verification procedures become much more than a means of error or fraud
control, leading to routine invasions of claimants' privacy and causing many eligible
individuals to be denied benefits or discouraged from ever applying for them."' 199 The
new and aggressive investigative techniques associated with this emerging "verification
("[PRWORA] places a premium on achieving caseload reduction through means that make it
more difficult for 'eligible' individuals to obtain benefits initially and to maintain eligibility
once on the rolls.").
191. Gilman, supra note 171, at 741 n.85; see also Diller, supra note 157, at 1123; Land,
supra note 174, at 818.
192. See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 171, at 741-43.
193. Id. at 742; see also Land, supra note 174, at 783 (noting an "increase in extreme child
poverty" tied to PRWORA).
194. Gilman, supra note 171, at 742; see also Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family
Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 277 (2000).
195. Gilman, supra note 171, at 742; Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and the Grand
Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verification Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36
COLuM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 663, 665 (2005).
196. See Diller, supra note 157, at 1145-86.
197. Quigley, Backwards, supra note 54, at 106-07.
198. Mulzer, supra note 195, at 674-78; see id. at 674 ("This [verification] practice has been
fueled by a new method of welfare administration, which relies less on formal policymaking and
more on signaling and intimation among policymakers, administrators, and front-line
workers."); see also GILLIOM, supra note 1, at 28; Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The
Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1878 (2005).
199. Mulzer, supra note 195, at 666; see also id. at 674 (describing the use of administrative




extremism"200 are designed not merely to ferret out applications submitted by the
posited legions of welfare queens 20 1 but also "to augment the hassle, intimidation, and
humiliation of applicants with an eye toward the policy goal of deterring all but the
most desperate from seeking aid., 20 2 This "[i]nformal rationing allows states to reduce
welfare rolls without cutting eligibility or benefit levels, leading the public to believe
that the drop was caused by a genuine reduction in need.,
20 3
Among the local verification methods devised to promote these objectives is a
resurrected variant of the traditional home visit. However, rather than follow the
template of the visits depicted in Wyman-where caseworkers met with families to
promote rehabilitative services and the care of children-this new version is explicitly
investigatory in design and conducted by law-enforcement officers whose sole purpose
is to search the home for evidence of ineligibility or fraud.2° Verification programs in
San Diego County, California, and Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, exemplify this
aggressive approach,0 5 while California's Los Angeles County has implemented a
moderated version of the same strategy.20 6 While there is significant variation among
these and related programs in other jurisdictions, 20 7 several shared attributes broadly
distinguish this new generation of home visits from the procedures at issue in
Wyman.
20 8
200. Id. at 674; see also Bennett, supra note 167, at 2164.
201. See, e.g., Mulzer, supra note 195, at 688-89; cf id. at 683 ("[P]ublic support for
welfare is complicated by concerns about claimants' moral status and deservingness. Stringent
and invasive verification procedures stigmatize the receipt of benefits and express these
concerns to claimants."). See generally Bennett, supra note 167.
202. GILLIoM, supra note 1, at 40 (arguing that "a broad[] cultural shaming of the poor" both
"stigmatize[s] and frighten[s]" the indigent and leads to a corresponding decline in applications
for aid); see, e.g., Mulzer, supra note 195, at 675 ("Some state and local agencies are using
verification procedures to stigmatize and embarrass claimants, not merely to reduce the number
of completed applications, but seemingly for the sake of stigma itself.").
203. Mulzer, supra note 195, at 675.
204. See Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916,918-19 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing
San Diego County's program); id. at 934-36 (Fisher, J., dissenting); S.L. v. Whitburn, 67 F.3d
1299, 1301-03 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing Milwaukee County's program); cf Hafetz, supra
note 3, at 228 ("The increased scrutiny of recipients to enforce measures like work requirements
has led to a rebirth of unannounced home visits in some states."); Bennett, supra note 167, at
2172 n.52.
205. See Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 918-19; id. at 934-36 (Fisher, J., dissenting); Whitburn, 67
F.3d at 1301-03.
206. Smith v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 703-05 (Ct. App.
2002) (describing Los Angeles County's program).
207. See, e.g., Roberson v. Giuliani, No. 99 Civ. 10900(DLC), 2000 WL 760300, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2000) (describing New York City's home visit program); Bennett, supra
note 167, at 2172 n.52 (describing program in New Hampshire); Mulzer, supra note 195, at 676
(describing New York City's program).
208. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("[Tihe simple fact of the matter is that a home
visit in Sanchez is fundamentally different from a home visit in Wyman.").
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a. San Diego County
The most aggressive of the new programs is San Diego County's "Project 100%"--
named in recognition of its requirement that 100% of the county's aid applicants must
submit to its demands. 209 Conceived and implemented in 1997 by the San Diego
District Attorney's Office,210 Project 100% requires that every aid applicant in the
county submit to a highly invasive home search conducted by sworn law-enforcement
investigators from the District Attorney's Public Assistance Fraud Division (PAFD).211
The program is partnered with a second and more aggressive search protocol reserved
for those applicants whose initial paperwork triggers some cause for suspicion.2 12
Project 100% thus applies exclusively to applicants for whom there is no basis to
suspect any fraud, wrongdoing, or grounds for ineligibility.213 Since its inception,
Project 100% has resulted in tens of thousands of suspicionless home searches.214
The sole purpose of Project 100% is to detect fraud or ineligibility.2 5 The fraud
investigators conducting the searches are expressly instructed to offer no guidance or
assistance to aid applicants during the course of the home visit, leaving that
responsibility instead to caseworkers in the county's Health and Human Services
Department. 2 6 When asked about the possibility that the visits might have some
rehabilitative component, the chief of PAFD scoffed at the proposition: "I'm trying to
envision what rehabilitation would be under those circumstances. Get off the couch.
Get a job. I don't know. So, no .... I don't envision rehabilitation as a part of that. I
can't even imagine what that would look like. '211 Moreover, while the denial of aid is
the only sanction if a search uncovers evidence that a pending application is
fraudulent,218 no such restriction applies to evidence of other crimes uncovered by
209. See Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief at 9-10, Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464
F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-55122), 2004 WL 1949000, at *9-*10.
210. The District Attorney's Office proposed Project 100% to the County Board of
Supervisors without input from or consultation with the county's welfare agency, which it
suspected would oppose the proposal. Id. at 10-11. When the details of Project 100% searches
were described to him, the director of the welfare agency responded: "[I]t certainly would be
inappropriate to treat anyone applying for benefits like a criminal .... And it certainly would
not be consistent with the values we espoused at the Health and Human Services Agency." Id. at
14.
211. See Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 918-20.
212. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 209, at 19.
213. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 918 ("[A]II San Diego County residents who submit welfare
applications.., and are not suspected of fraud or ineligibility, are automatically enrolled in
Project 100%."); Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 209, at 19.
214. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, No. OOCVI467JM(JFS), 2001 WL 1830236, at *4
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2001) (granting, in part, a motion for class certification).
215. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919; id. at 935 (Fisher, J., dissenting) ("According to the
defendants themselves, the program's objective is not to assist the needy, but to 'increase
welfare fraud prevention efforts and to increase program integrity."').
216. Id. at 935 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (Project 100% investigators are "trained not to give
advice to applicants" (emphasis in original)); Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note
209, at 16.
217. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 209, at 15-16.
218. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919.
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investigators inside the home. 219 Accordingly, Project 100% searches can and do
trigger prosecutions for other criminal conduct, 220 and "[o]n occasion, the investigators
even arrange for arrests."
221
The protocol for a Project 100% search illustrates the highly invasive character of
the intrusion. When applicants first seek public assistance from the county's welfare
agency, "they are informed that they will be subject to a mandatory home visit in order
to verify their eligibility." 222 Applicants do not receive an appointment time and are not
even told what day the search will occur, although it typically takes place within ten
days of the initial application.223 Instead, investigators in plainclothes appear at the
door, "identify themselves to applicants by showing either a metal badge or folding
identification card with the District Attorney logo," and request entry.224 Applicants are
told from the outset that if they do not permit the search, they will receive no aid. 25
Once inside, investigators may spend an hour or more226 interviewing the applicant
regarding eligibility criteria and conducting a "walk-through" of the home.227 During
the interview, investigators "ask to see bank statements, pay stubs, tax returns, benefit
check stubs, and other documents .... [N]othing is 'off-limits.' 228 In the course of the
subsequent walk-through, investigators may search any space within the home that they
deem relevant to verification,229 and an applicant's refusal to permit inspection of any
portion of the home will result in the denial of benefits.230 Investigators thus "may
request to look at the contents of bedrooms, closets, kitchens, bathrooms, medicine
cabinets and drawers in search of evidence of ineligibility or fraud.",23' Focusing
primarily on evidence of an undisclosed male in the household, investigators count
toothbrushes, look for men's bath products, examine the contents of laundry baskets,
219. Id. at 919 n.3.
220. Id.; see also Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
221. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 934 n.1 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 919 (majority opinion).
223. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, No. OOCV1467JM(JFS), 2003 WL 25655642, at *2
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2003), affd, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006).
224. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 934 n.2 (Fisher, J., dissenting); Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at
* 1; see also Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 209, at 21-22.
225. Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *2; Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note
209, at 20 (noting that an orientation video viewed by all aid applicants warns that "[i]f you do
not cooperate [with the PAFD investigator who visits the home], your benefits will be stopped
or denied.").
226. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 209, at 21.
227. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 918; Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *2.
228. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 209, at 22-23.
229. Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *8 n.8 ("[N]o specific protocol limits where the
investigator may look .... ").
230. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 209, at 27 n.20 ("[E]ligibility
technicians deny applications if the Fraud Investigator reports that an applicant refused to
answer questions, or refused full entry to her residence.").
231. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 936 (Fisher, J., dissenting). Failure to provide such consent
constitutes noncompliance and will lead to the denial of benefits. See Sanchez, 2003 WL
25655642, at *2.
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open refrigerators, and explore the contents of trash cans and dresser drawers. 232
Investigators do not open drawers or closets themselves but instead ask the applicants
to do so. 233 One investigator explained that this is done to "[p]rotect yourself, safety. I
don't want to stick my hand in anything. I want her to open everything and let me
look., 234 Once the search is completed, investigators transmit their conclusions to
caseworkers in the county's welfare agency.235 Unless the investigator indicates that the
home visit was successful, the caseworker will deny the application.236
Notably, San Diego County gathers no data that isolates the rate at which Project
100% searches detect fraud or ineligibility.237 Instead, the county combines Project
100% with a parallel allegation-based investigative program to generate aggregate
statistics addressing the outcome of all welfare-related investigations, both
suspicionless and cause-based. 238 Accordingly, the county has no data addressing the
efficacy of Project 100% that is not embedded with and skewed by unrelated
information generated by the investigation of applicants for whom the county has cause
to suspect fraud or ineligibility-searches that presumably will yield a far higher rate
of denied applications. 239 Evidently by design, the county is incapable of assessing the
effect of its program.
b. Milwaukee and Los Angeles Counties
While Project 100% defines the outer perimeter of aggressive search practices used
to verify eligibility for aid, other jurisdictions have developed similar home-visit
programs that share many of the same characteristics. Policies adopted by the counties
of Milwaukee and Los Angeles exemplify these closely related verification
strategies.
24°
Milwaukee County's search program, dating to the early period of welfare reform,
began as a local initiative and preceded the 1996 federal legislation by several years.241
The program incorporates many of the features of San Diego County's approach: the
232. Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *2, *8 n.8; Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, supra
note 209, at 23-25.
233. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 209, at 24-25.
234. Id. at 25.
235. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919 n.l.
236. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 209, at 27 n.20; see also Sanchez, 464
F.3d at 919.
237. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 209, at 27-28.
238. Id.
239. Cf. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 928 ("Appellants argue that there is no statistically significant
evidence that Project 100% has actually reduced welfare fraud. The County, however, produced
data showing that, during the five-year period during which Project 100% was implemented, the
overall denial rate increased from 40.6% to 47.7% .... (emphasis added)); County of San
Diego's Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 34-35, Sanchez v. County of San Diego,
128 S. Ct. 649 (2007) (No. 07-211), 2007 WL 3068439 (arguing that "the home visit program
has been successful" based on aggregate data).
240. S.L. v. Whitbum, 67 F.3d 1299 (7th Cir. 1995); Smith v. L.A. County Bd. of
Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (Ct. App. 2002).
241. See Bennett, supra note 167, at 2172 n.52; cf. Whitburn, 67 F.3d at 1301-02.
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warrantless searches are unscheduled; 242 benefits are typically contingent upon consent
to entry;243 caseworkers play no role in the investigation, which is instead carried out
by a private investigative service (but not by sworn law-enforcement investigators, as
used in Project 100%);244 and the searches are designed exclusively to uncover
evidence of fraud or ineligibility, with no rehabilitative component.245 The program
differs from Project 100%, however, in some significant respects as well. Most
notably, Milwaukee's home searches do not target all applicants but instead just those
whose initial submissions are deemed insufficient to verify eligibility. 246 Once inside
the home, however, the investigators scrutinize the dwelling with the same intensity
that characterizes a Project 100% search: "Field representatives may ask to see areas of
the residence, and they can ask for permission to inspect closets, cabinets, attics,
basements, garages, etc."
247
The County of Los Angeles recently instituted a home search program as well,
although its approach lacks some of the harshest features of Project 100%. In Los
Angeles, as in San Diego, a home visit is a condition of eligibility for all TANF
applicants in the four "pilot" districts subject to the new search program. 24 The visits
are unscheduled and may occur at any point during a ten-day period following the
submission of an aid application.249 Unlike San Diego and Milwaukee, however, Los
Angeles claims to pursue "the dual purposes of eliminating welfare fraud and
identifying additional services that can help with family needs." 250 In keeping with the
rehabilitative component of its program, Los Angeles County employs "eligibility
workers" rather than law enforcement investigators to conduct home visits25' and does
not refer applicants for criminal prosecution based on the search results.252 The "walk-
throughs" under the Los Angeles program are also less intense than the searches
conducted in San Diego and Milwaukee: eligibility workers are trained to "'look[] for
242. Whitburn, 67 F.3d at 1302.
243. Id. at 1308. In upholding Milwaukee's search program, Judge Manion of the Seventh
Circuit acknowledges that "benefits may be withheld or withdrawn if an applicant does not
allow the home visit," but emphasizes that "[t]here is no evidence or reason to believe that an
applicant who declines the home visit will be denied benefits even if satisfactory verification of
eligibility is provided by some other means." Id. The latter scenario is presumably quite unusual,
since applicants will likely produce all available documentation before inviting the intrusion and
inconvenience of an unscheduled home visit.
244. See id. at 1302.
245. See id. at 1308 ("Although some of [the Wyman] factors related to the caseworker's
duty to ensure the health and safety of children receiving AFDC benefits, many of the
considerations emphasized by the Court apply in this case"; the court then discusses fiscal
integrity and fraud detection).
246. See id. at 1302.
247. Id.
248. Smith v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 702-04 (Ct. App.
2002).
249. Appellants' Opening Brief at 10-11, Smith v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 2d. 700 (Ct. App. 2002) (No. B150973), 2002 WL 32152027, at *10-*l1.
250. Smith, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703-04.
251. Seeid. at 704-05.
252. Id. at 704.
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the obvious things that are just right out in front of yOU' 253 and "are prohibited from
opening drawers or closets during their walk-through of the home.,
254
Unlike San Diego, Los Angeles County collects data addressing the efficacy of its
program. During the first six months of implementation, 120 of the 4813 home visits
conducted under the pilot progran--approximately 2.5% of the total-identified
"conditions of ineligibility resulting in denial of the application."255 Accordingly, of the
nearly 5000 suspicionless home visits completed by Los Angeles County during the
initial phase of its verification program, 97.5% were futile.
B. Constitutionalizing the Modern Home Visit
The home-visit policies implemented in San Diego, Milwaukee, and Los Angeles
have each faced and withstood constitutional challenge. 256 In upholding the programs,
courts have relied on two primary rationales: first, that the holding in Wyman
authorizes the practices; and, second, that the contemporary special-needs doctrine
independently justifies the intrusions. 257 Neither rationale withstands scrutiny.
253. Id. at 705 (quoting training instructions for eligibility workers).
254. Id. at 712. There is evidence, however, that this restriction is not always honored. See
Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 249, at 19 ("[T]he home call worker looked through [the
applicant's] apartment and asked her to open all the closet doors and dresser drawers, including
her underwear drawer.").
255. Smith, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705.
256. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006) (San Diego); S.L. v.
Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Milwaukee); Smith, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (Los
Angeles).
257. The courts have also relied on the proposition that the searches are consensual and
therefore permissible under the consent doctrine. The question whether a public benefit may be
conditioned on the sacrifice of a constitutional right-here, the Fourth Amendment-has been
the subject of decades of conflicting commentary and decisional law that is beyond the scope of
this Article to address. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Foreword.: Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4, 6 (1988) (describing the problem
as "the basic structural issue that for over a hundred years has bedeviled courts and
commentators alike under the mysterious title of 'unconstitutional conditions"'); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415-16 (1989) (observing
that the decisional law in the area is "a minefield to be traversed gingerly").
Apart from the unconstitutional-conditions issue, however, the concrete setting in which
consent is obtained in the context of welfare home visits is itself exceptionally coercive-
manifest in the fact that the aid applicant must choose between asserting her constitutional right
and securing the means to feed, clothe, and shelter her children. See supra note 107; see also,
e.g., Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); Recent Case, Constitutional Law--Fourth
Amendment-Ninth Circuit Upholds Conditioning Receipt of Welfare Benefits on Consent to
Suspicionless Home Visits-Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d916 (9th Cir. 2006), 120
HARv. L. REV. 1996, 2001-02 (2007) [hereinafter Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment].
Data from Los Angeles's pilot search program strongly corroborates this conclusion. Of the
4800 searches that the county conducted during the first six months of its program, a total of
eight applicants stood on their privacy rights, refused to provide consent, and accordingly
sacrificed subsistence aid for their children and dependents. Smith, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706.
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1. Reinventing Wyman
Although Wyman notably departed from Fourth Amendment doctrine to exempt the
poor from its traditional protections, the reach of the decision was limited in evident
respects. In explaining its conclusion that the home visit was a reasonable intrusion for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Wyman offered a list of eleven factors that
purportedly distinguished the visit from other types of government searches. 28 The
enumerated considerations evoke a quite specific conception of the encounter: a
paternalistic interaction between aid recipients and their social workers that was
relatively benevolent, restrained, and designed to promote rehabilitative as well as
investigatory objectives. 259 Although the new generation of home search programs
incorporates few, if any, of these moderating characteristics, courts have nevertheless
declared that Wyman controls and dictates that these "radically different" 260 programs
be upheld.26'
a. The Rehabilitative Purpose of the Visit
Foundational to Wyman's analysis was the rehabilitative purpose of the challenged
home visits. At the outset of the opinion, in explaining its conclusion that the visit did
not fall within the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the Court turned first to the
objectives of the visiting social worker:
It is ... true that the caseworker's posture in the home visit is perhaps, in a sense,
both rehabilitative and investigative. But this latter aspect, we think, is given too
broad a character and far more emphasis than it deserves if it is equated with a
search in the traditional criminal law context.
262
The Court reiterated the theme as it argued that the visits, even if considered searches
under the Fourth Amendment, were reasonable and thus permissible:
The emphasis of the [program] is upon the home, upon "close contact" with the
beneficiary, upon restoring the aid recipient "to a condition of self-support," and
upon the relief of his distress. The federal emphasis is no different. It is upon
"assistance and rehabilitation," upon maintaining and strengthening family life,
and upon "maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the
maintenance of continuing parental care and protection."
263
258. See supra Part I.C.
259. See supra Part I.C.
260. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 938 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
261. See id. at 921 (majority opinion) ("Wyman directly controls the instant case.");
Whitburn, 67 F.3d. at 1308; cf. Smith, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712-13. Indeed, while the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that Wyman "arguably has been called into question by the Supreme
Court's subsequent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence," it nonetheless declared that the opinion
"still controls this case because of its 'direct application,' despite the reasoning of these later
administrative search cases." Sanchez, 464 F.3d. at 922 n.8.
262. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971).
263. Id. at 319 (citations omitted).
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The Court continued: "[T]he visit is 'the heart of welfare administration';... it affords
4a personal, rehabilitative orientation, unlike that of most federal programs'; and...
the 'more pronounced service orientation' effected by Congress... 'gave redoubled
importance to the practice of home visiting. ' ' '264 "The caseworker," the Court
concluded, "is not a sleuth but rather, we trust, is a friend to one in need., 265 While the
opinion simultaneously and somewhat schizophrenically stressed that the visitors
skeptically assessed the veracity and need of aid recipients,26 6 the supportive function
of the visiting social worker played a central and arguably predominant role in the
Court's conclusion that the challenged practice was constitutional.267
Of the three contemporary search programs considered by the lower courts, policies
implemented by San Diego and Milwaukee Counties are expressly investigatory in
nature, with no rehabilitative or service component.268 Rather than questioning the
application of Wyman to such divergent facts, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits dismissed
or ignored the distinction. 269 The approach of the Ninth Circuit was summarized at oral
argument by Judge Andrew Kleinfeld, who joined the Sanchez majority in upholding
Project 100%.270 In response to counsel's argument that the rehabilitative and service
objectives were a key distinguishing feature in Wyman, Kleinfeld simply denied the
fact: "Nah, . . . that wasn't Wyman. They weren't there to help them. It was a...
caseworker investigation., 27' Thus in the retelling, Wyman's "friend to one in need"
actually "[wasn't] there to help" at all: a frank distortion of the opinion that
dramatically expands Wyman's reach.
The majority opinion in Sanchez carries forward Judge Kleinfeld's approach. The
analysis begins with the proposition that "rehabilitative purpose," as used in Wyman,
merely refers to one of the encompassing statutory objectives of all federal welfare
laws, which "are the same background against which San Diego County's welfare
program is administered" 272-and, thus, that "there is no greater showing of a
rehabilitative purpose [in Wyman] than there is in this case." 273 This remarkable
assertion ignores two prominent facts. First, under San Diego's program, the
rehabilitative and service objectives of the federal scheme are carried out
independently of the home searches at issue, which instead focus exclusively on
investigatory objectives-unlike in Wyman, where the home visits served both
264. Id. at 319-20 (citations omitted).
265. Id. at 323.
266. See id. at 344 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
267. See supra notes 262-65 and accompanying text; Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317 (majority
opinion) ("[T]his latter [investigatory] aspect, we think, is given too broad a character and far
more emphasis than it deserves... ."); see also Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916,
933 (9th Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J., dissenting).
268. See supra notes 215-21 & 245 and accompanying text; see also Sanchez, 464 F.3d at
934-35 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
269. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 921 nn.6-7; S.L. v. Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299, 1309 (7th Cir.
1995).
270. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 918.
271. Audio file: Oral Argument, Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (No. 04-05122) (remarks of
Kleinfeld, J., at 5:12) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
272. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 921 nn.6-7.
273. Id. at 921 n.6.
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rehabilitative and investigatory purposes, as the Supreme Court emphatically and
274
repeatedly underscored. Second, the claim ignores Wyman's specific emphasis on
the concrete rehabilitative relationship established between caseworkers and the aid
recipients to whom they purportedly serve as "a friend to one in need., 275 That
personal, assisting relationship, developed within the context of the recipient's home,
played a central role in Wyman's characterization of the reasonableness ofthe visits at
issue.276 To equate "rehabilitation" as used in this concrete sense with San Diego's
purely investigatory search program, simply because both proceed under a broad
federal grant of authority that includes rehabilitation among its general statutory goals,
is an impossible stretch. San Diego County may seek to promote the rehabilitation of
aid recipients, but it most assuredly does not do so while searching their dresser
drawers.
The Sanchez majority alternatively asserts that the rehabilitative purpose of a
Wyman visit, to the extent that it might differ from the objectives of Project 100%, "is
relevant only insofar as it indicates that the home visits are not intended as searches
conducted in furtherance of a criminal investigation." 277 In turn, because San Diego
does not pursue criminal sanctions in cases where a Project 100% search uncovers
evidence that a pending application might be fraudulent, 278 the court concludes that any
distinction between the rehabilitative objectives in Wyman and Sanchez is irrelevant.279
There are two significant problems with this argument. First, it ignores the
substantial criminal-enforcement dimensions of San Diego's home search program,
under which investigators "make referrals for criminal investigation if they discover
evidence of contraband, child abuse or a subject with outstanding felony warrants," and
"[o]n occasion ... even arrange for arrests., 280 Second, the argument again defies the
Wyman text. Wyman did not address the program's rehabilitative and service objectives
solely with reference to whether the home visit should be analogized to a criminal
search, but instead stressed those purposes as separate considerations that
independently supported the reasonableness of the intrusion. Thus, in the Court's
enumeration of eleven factors demonstrating the reasonableness of the challenged
practice, three solely addressed the rehabilitative and service objectives of the visit;281
two conversely addressed the absence of criminal consequences, with no reference to
service or rehabilitation;282 and one factor addressed the two considerations in
274. See supra notes 262-65; Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 935 n.4 (Fisher, J., dissenting). Indeed,
the Wyman Court expressly underscored that the home visit under review directly facilitated the
statute's rehabilitative objectives. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 319-20 (1971) ("[T]he 'more
pronounced service orientation' effected by Congress ... 'gave redoubled importance to the
practice of home visiting."').
275. See supra notes 262-67 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 262-67 and accompanying text.
277. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 921 n.7.
278. Id. at 919; see also Sanchez v. County of San Diego, No. 00CV1467JM(JFS), 2003 WL
25655642, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2003), affd, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006).
279. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 921 n.7.
280. Id. at 934 n. 1 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
281. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-20 (1971) (factors one, four, and five).
282. Id. at 321, 323 (factors seven and ten).
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conjunction.283 The claim that Wyman fused the concerns is irreconcilable with the
terms of the opinion itself
For the balance of its analysis, Sanchez makes no reference to the supportive
objectives of the home visit, focusing instead on other Wyman factors that overlap with
San Diego's program.284 Having thus read rehabilitation out of the text, the Ninth
Circuit recasts the Wyman visit as an investigatory effort-like Project 100 0/--to
thwart welfare fraud.285 So fictionalized, Wyman now stands for the proposition that a
warrantless, suspicionless, and purely investigatory search of the most private and
intimate spaces within an aid applicant's home, conducted without notice by law-
enforcement fraud investigators, operates outside the reach of the Fourth
Amendment.8 6
The Seventh Circuit's approach in upholding Milwaukee's search program mirrors
the Ninth Circuit's account. 287 After acknowledging in passing the role of rehabilitation
and service in the Wyman analysis, the Whitburn court simply moves on:
In Wyman, the Supreme Court held that the home visit at issue in that case was
justified because of the important state interests furthered by the home visit.
Although some of [the Wyman] factors related to the caseworker's duty to ensure
the health and safety of children receiving AFDC benefits, many of the
considerations emphasized by the Court apply in this case.
2 88
The court thereafter discusses only those Wyman factors that overlap with or
"approximate ' 289 Milwaukee's policy, with a single exception. 290 At the end of the
opinion, the court acknowledges that one factor-relating to the provision of notice in
advance of the home visit-is missing from Milwaukee's protocol. In response, the
court states that the difference "represent[s] only one of the eleven factors Wyman
enumerated as supporting its [reasonableness] conclusion .... The strength of the
remaining ten factors leads us to conclude that home visits conducted pursuant to the
County's current policy ... are reasonable. 219 Of those ten remaining factors
purportedly offering "strong" analytic support for the Seventh Circuit's conclusion, no
less than four relate in whole or in part to the rehabilitative and service objectives of
the Wyman visit292 -considerations that are irrelevant to Milwaukee's search policy.
283. Id. at 322-23 (factor nine).
284. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 923-25.
285. Id. at 923 ("Here, as in Wyman, the home visits serve the important governmental
interests of verifying an applicant's eligibility for welfare benefits and preventing fraud.").
286. See id. at 923-25.
287. S.L. v. Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299, 1308-10 (7th Cir. 1995).
288. Id. at 1308.
289. Id. at 1308-10.
290. Id. at 1310.
291. Id.
292. See supra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
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b. The Role of the Caseworker
Central to Wyman's analysis of the rehabilitative and service dimensions of the
challenged visits was the particular role played by social workers in carrying them out.
Few considerations capture more concretely the difference between the programs at
issue than the fact that social workers entered the homes in Wyman while law-
enforcement fraud investigators or employees of a private investigative service enter
the homes in Sanchez and Whitburn. Highlighting the distinction, Wyman isolated the
caseworker's function as an independent factor supporting the reasonableness of the
intrusion: "The visit is not one by police or uniformed authority. It is made by a
caseworker of some training whose primary objective is, or should be, the welfare, not
the prosecution, of the aid recipient for whom the worker has profound
responsibility., 293 The Wyman dissent, even as it pressed to analogize the home visit to
a traditional criminal search, acknowledged the supportive function of the visiting
social worker: "No one questions the motives of the dedicated welfare caseworker. Of
course, caseworkers seek to be friends, but the point is that they are also required to be
sleuths."
294
The Seventh Circuit's application of this factor to Milwaukee's search program
reduces to the observation that "the visit at issue was not made by police or uniformed
authority., 295 Having erased the Court's emphasis on the caseworker's "training,"
"profound responsibility," and role as "a friend to one in need," the Seventh Circuit
equates Milwaukee's private investigator with Wyman's social worker based on the
clothes they wear.296 The Ninth Circuit's approach is no less facile. As in Whitburn, the
Sanchez majority recounts this factor without reference to the supportive functions of
the visiting caseworker, framing the question instead as whether the visitor wears a
uniform and reports "evidence of criminal activity for potential prosecution. 297
Asserting that San Diego's fraud investigators do neither-a highly questionable
proposition, as noted above 298 -the Ninth Circuit concludes that the distinction
between social workers and law enforcement personnel is inconsequential.299
c. The Burden of the Intrusion
Another consideration highlighted by the Wyman Court was the fact that the
challenged policy "minimize[d] any 'burden' upon the homeowner's right against
unreasonable intrusion."300 Listing the qualities of the visit that reflected this minimal
burden, the Court noted that the applicant received "written notice several days in
advance of the intended home visit"; that the "date was specified"; that "[p]rivacy
[was] emphasized"; and that "snooping in the home [was] forbidden."30' The Court
293. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 322-23 (1971).
294. Id. at 339 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
295. Whitburn, 67 F.3d at 1309.
296. Id.
297. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2006).
298. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
300. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 321 (1971) (factor six).
301. Id. at 320-21 (noting that Mrs. James's complaint "refers to no snooping" and
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characterized the program as "a gentle means, of limited extent and of practical and
considerate application," to achieve the state's interests.30 2 Virtually all of these
moderating influences are absent from the contemporary home-visit policies that have
withstood constitutional challenge.
i. Providing Notice
None of the challenged programs provides any specific notice of the impending
visit; at best, applicants are told that they will receive a visit at some point during a ten-
day interval,30 3 in contrast to Wyman's specification of the date itself.3 4 In the
retelling, however, the distinction disappears: each of the courts translates the
divergent practice into a reflection of, rather than departure from, the salutary practice
in Wyman. Thus the California Court of Appeals, in upholding Los Angeles's home-
visit program, asserts that the policy does not "impose a substantial intrusion into
personal privacy" and "is consistent with the reasoning" in Wyman because, inter alia,
"[e]ligibility workers must give notice that a home visit is planned within 10 days of
the intake." 305 The court in Sanchez, considering a protocol that provides no notice of
the period within which the search will occur, makes the same assertion: "The Project
100% home visits ... have many of the same procedural safeguards that the Wyman
Court found significant. Applicants are given notice that they will be subject to a
mandatory home visit and visits generally occur only during normal business hours.
3 °6
The Seventh Circuit addresses the distinction with a slightly greater degree of
candor. After noting that Mrs. James received various procedural accommodations,
including "several days' advance notice of the intended home visit, 30 7 Whitburn
initially asserts that "[w]hile not all these factors are present in this case, the County's
current policy does approximate these features. Currently, the County gives the
applicant notice that his home will be visited in the next 10 days." 30 8 In contrast to the
courts in Sanchez and Smith, however, the Seventh Circuit does not end its analysis
with this suggestion of rough parity between specific notice and a ten-day window. It
instead acknowledges that Milwaukee's notice protocol differs from the Wyman
policy 0 9 but excuses the distinction on two grounds: first, that it is not sufficiently
"describes no impolite or reprehensible conduct of any kind").
302. Id. at 319.
303. See, e.g., Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2006)
("Applicants... are not given notice of the exact date and time the visit will occur. The visits
are generally made within 10 days of receipt of the application .... "), aff'g No.
OOCVI467JM(JFS), 2003 WL 25655642, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2003) ("Applicants... are
not informed that the visit will occur... within ten days of the application being submitted.");
S.L. v. Whitbum, 67 F.3d 1299, 1310 (7th Cir. 1995) (ten-day window); Smith v. L.A. County
Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712 (Ct. App. 2002) (ten-day window).
304. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 320-21. The Court in Wyman noted evidence in the record
suggesting that, in practice, caseworkers often made unannounced visits. The Court thereafter
ignored the evidence and analyzed the policy as written rather than as applied. See id. at 320
n.8.
305. Smith, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712.
306. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 924 (citation omitted).
307. Whitburn, 67 F.3d at 1309.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1310.
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important to outweigh the other purported similarities between the two programs, 310
and, second, that the specific notice provided in Wyman is actually a bad idea.3 11
The reasonableness of this policy is underscored when one considers the practical
limitations for the County as well as the applicant on providing notice of the
specific day of the visit.... [O]ften applicants are not there on the day the County
attempts to conduct the home visit. Or the County worker may be unable to
complete all of the scheduled home visits because others set for that day take
longer than expected. Under a requirement that notice of the specific day be given,
new notice-even for a visit the following day-would be required. Not only
would this prove to be expensive and burdensome to the County, but in the end the
applicant could be the one to suffer, either by being required to be at home for the
scheduled visit, or by a delay in the verification process and a corresponding delay
in receiving benefits.
312
Apart from its incoherent factual premise,313 this critique is remarkable in two
respects. First, it applies with equal or greater force to Milwaukee's own protocol,
unless one presumes that aid recipients are sufficiently desperate for assistance that
they will suspend all life activities outside the home for the ten-day period and wait
patiently for a knock at the door. If that is true-and it well may be 3 '4 -the magnitude
of the burden imposed on aid applicants by Milwaukee's procedure dwarfs any of the
purported benefits identified in the Seventh Circuit's analysis. Otherwise, applicants
with no idea when a visit might occur may well be gone when the investigator arrives,
necessitating a second or third visit that triggers precisely the same delays and burdens
that supposedly so trouble the Whitburn court. The proposition that a surprise visit is
better for aid applicants than a scheduled one is nearly fatuous-not merely with
respect to the court's claim that a surprise visit might accelerate the time within which
applicants obtain aid,3 15 but more basically with respect to its humiliating and
disruptive impact on the applicant's life. Without the ability to anticipate a visit,
applicants lose all control over the circumstances under which strangers may enter their
homes and face instead the indignity of their lives laid bare at a moment's notice.
Second, the Seventh Circuit offers this critique in defiance of Wyman's own




313. The court asserts that specific notice would delay the receipt of benefits. The argument
rests in part on the proposition that "applicants [often] are not there on the day the County
attempts to conduct the home visit," thus necessitating follow-up visits that might be delayed if
the County were forced to issue new notice. Id. What the analysis inexplicably omits to
acknowledge is the obvious fact that applicants would be at home for the initial visit if they
received specific notice of it in the first instance-rendering irrelevant the court's purported
concern about the timing of subsequent follow-up efforts.
314. Knowing that vital aid to feed one's family is dependent on a satisfactory home visit,
applicants facing an open window of time may well suspend much of their life's activities-
including, notably, efforts to find and maintain employment-so that they do not risk the denial
of aid for failure to comply with the search condition.
315. See supra note 313.
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identified by the Seventh Circuit applies with equal force to the procedure lauded in
Wyman as an element of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. There, as here,
caseworkers may be running late, may be forced to reschedule, and may delay
verification until the visit occurs-but the Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that
the obvious benefits of specific notice still predominated.316 The Seventh Circuit's
argument amounts to a declaration that the Supreme Court got it wrong and should be
ignored.
Unacknowledged in all of these decisions is the evident reason why the challenged
investigatory policies provide no notice. If the premise of the programs is to detect
fraud or ineligibility--often in the form of an undeclared male in the household-the
element of surprise will play an important role in uncovering the stray toothbrush, or
pair of men's shoes, that might betray his presence. The fact that Wyman's program
lacked this essential investigatory attribute highlights the fundamentally different
procedure under review in that case and the contrasting focus of contemporary search
programs-a focus that is exclusively investigatory and thus squarely within the reach
of traditional Fourth Amendment analysis. The specific notice provided in Wyman,
which advanced the objectives of a largely rehabilitative and respectful social-worker
visit, is irreconcilable with any policy designed to catch unsuspecting applicants in
disqualifying conduct.
ii. No "Snooping"
While Wyman provided little description of the activities of the social worker within
the home, the Court strongly suggested that the visit did not include an invasive search.
In describing the objections of Mrs. James, the Court noted that she supported her
claim with affidavits from other aid recipients who complained about various aspects
of their home visits.3 17 As described in the opinion, the complaints of Mrs. James and
her corroborating witnesses made no reference to any search practices but instead
focused on the nature of the colloquy between recipients and their social workers-for
example, several complained that the caseworkers asked embarrassing questions in the
presence of children.
318
[Mrs. James] alleges only ... that on previous visits and, on information and
belief, on visitation at the home of other aid recipients, "questions concerning
personal relationships, beliefs and behavior are raised and pressed which are
unnecessary for a determination of continuing eligibility." Paradoxically, this same
complaint could be made of a conference held elsewhere than in the home ....
The same complaint could be made of the census taker's questions.
319
Corroborating the conclusion that the challenged visit focused on a discussion with the
recipient rather than an inspection of her home, the Court twice observed that the
reasonableness of the policy was bolstered by the fact that it involved no
316. See supra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
317. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 320 n.8 (1971).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 321.
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"snooping." 320 Although "snooping" is hardly a term of art, its definition centers on the
act of"prowl[ing] or pry[ing] ' , 321 and necessarily implies some significant scrutiny of
private areas and effects.
The search policies implemented by the counties of San Diego and Milwaukee are
unlimited in reach, permitting investigators to inspect any closed or private space
within the home, while the policy of Los Angeles County involves a more limited
walk-through that does not include inspection of drawers, closets, and other closed
spaces.322 All three reach well beyond the in-home questioning evidently at issue in
Wyman. Of the opinions upholding these practices, however, only one acknowledges
the distinction.323 The Ninth Circuit in Sanchez dismissed the "snooping" factor in a
footnote with the assertion that, "[s]ince the investigators have legitimate verification-
related reasons for viewing... items [in closets, drawers, or medicine cabinets], and
only do so with the homeowner's explicit consent, their activity cannot fairly be
characterized as 'snooping. 
324
The Ninth Circuit's argument grafts a novel distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate investigatory activities onto the concept of "snooping." The definition of
the word-which focuses on the act of"pry[ing] into the private affairs of others' 32 5-
does not require such a limitation, and there is no indication in Wyman that the Court
had such a distinction in mind when it emphasized the limited reach of the social
worker's intrusion. Indeed, under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, an invasive search
would have been entirely "legitimate" on the facts of Wyman itself, since the social
worker was charged in part with verifying "that the intended and proper objects of that
tax-produced assistance are the ones who benefit from the aid it dispenses."3 26 Since
virtually any space or object within the home might yield information bearing on the
320. Id.
321. WEBSTER'S UNIVERSAL COLLEGE DICTIONARY 743 (2001).
322. See supra notes 227-34, 247, 253-54 and accompanying text.
323. See Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916,924 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
the argument that San Diego's more intrusive search practices conflict with Wyman's
admonition against "snooping"). In Smith, the California Court of Appeal contrasted Los
Angeles's program instead with a mass welfare raid at issue in an earlier California case:
In Parrish [v. Civil Service Commission, 425 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1967)], the
social workers were instructed to "conduct a thorough search of the entire
dwelling, giving particular attention to beds, closets, bathrooms and other
possible places of concealment." In contrast, the pilot program here did not
involve mass raids .... Eligibility workers making a home visit are
instructed not to open closets or drawers.
Smith v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 713-14 (Ct. App. 2002).
324. Sanchez, 464 F.3d. at 924 n.13 (emphasis in original). As to the assertion that consent
might transform an invasive search into something other than "snooping," the Sanchez dissent
provides a succinct response: "[O]btaining consent to snoop cannot change the nature of the
ensuing conduct-snooping-any more than obtaining consent to search changes the nature of
the search that follows." Id. at 936 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the
majority's argument rests on the presence of valid consent and is thus irrelevant in this context,
given the highly coercive nature of the circumstances surrounding an applicant's request for
subsistence aid. See supra notes 107, 257.
325. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1647 (2000).
326. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 319 (1971).
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"objects of ... assistance," no area would fall beyond the "legitimate" reach of a
verification-related inspection. Accordingly, if the Court in Wyman used "snooping" in
the manner suggested by the Ninth Circuit, it necessarily extolled not simply the
absence of an invasive inspection of Mrs. James's home but more precisely the absence
of an improperly motivated search of the premises.
The only activity that might run afoul of a "snooping" proscription, so construed,
would be rummaging about the recipient's house for information wholly unrelated to
the verification objectives of the home visit-perhaps to satisfy the caseworker's
private curiosity or the government's interest in using the home visit as a pretense to
spy on its citizenry.327 It defies any plausible reading of the text to suggest that the
Wyman Court, in highlighting the absence of "snooping" in the visits at issue, was
merely lauding the fact that the social workers resisted such an improbable
temptation-rather than emphasizing instead the singular fact that the visits at issue
involved no inspection whatsoever, despite the "legitimate" investigatory value of a
more invasive search.
d. Summary
Shorn of its rehabilitative purpose, the participation of trained and supportive social
workers, the provision of advance notice, and virtually all limits on its invasive reach,
the reinvented Wyman home visit is a frankly confrontational and highly intrusive
encounter between applicants and investigators. The Wyman factors left intact by the
contemporary caricature of its analysis-the need to assure that public funds are
properly spent,328 the importance of verifying eligibility,329 and the diminished privacy
interests of those seeking public aid33 -justify exceptionally aggressive investigative
techniques that bear no relation to the actual visits upheld in the case. As seven judges
noted in their dissent from the Ninth Circuit's denial of rehearing en banc in Sanchez,
"The differences between San Diego's program and the program in Wyman are of a
quality and character that cannot be ignored.... [T]he simple fact of the matter is that
a home visit in Sanchez is fundamentally different from a home visit in Wyman."33'
Rather than admit the obvious divergence, the courts in Sanchez, Whitburn, and Smith
have instead manufactured a fictionalized version of the precedent to support-indeed,
to dictate-their authorization of dramatically more aggressive home search programs.
2. Reinventing Special Needs
The second rationale employed to justify aggressive home search policies focuses
on the Fourth Amendment's special-needs doctrine that emerged in the decades
following Wyman. Among the reasons why Wyman is--or should be-irrelevant to the
current analysis of search practices is the fact that the doctrinal approach to the
327. Cf. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 924 n.13.
328. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318-19.
329. Id. at 322.
330. Id. at 319.
331. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
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question presented in Wyman has changed dramatically in the intervening years.3 32 The
new doctrine, originating in decisions that predated Wyman but more fully articulated
in a series of cases decided in the late 1980s and 1990s, specifically addresses the
permissibility of warrantless and suspicionless searches for purposes unrelated to law
enforcement.333 Despite the fact that the search procedures at issue in cases such as
Sanchez and Whitburn lack virtually all the essential attributes of the narrow class of
suspicionless inspections sanctioned by the new methodology, courts have nonetheless
construed the special-needs doctrine to accommodate the challenged practices-again,
by seriously distorting the governing precedent.
334
a. Analytic Framework
With its decision in Camara v. Municipal Cour?35 in 1967, the Supreme Court set
in motion a distinct jurisprudence to assess noncriminal searches under the Fourth
Amendment. The Camara Court held that the Fourth Amendment's traditional warrant
requirement applied to administrative searches, such as housing inspections, but that
the corresponding requirement of probable cause was inapplicable in view of the
noncriminal interests at stake.336 Wyman, which followed Camara by five years,
ignored its holding and engaged in a sui generis analysis of the noncriminal,
warrantless entry at issue in the case-rendering the opinion anomalous even by then-
applicable constitutional standards.337 That divergence has only widened over the
intervening years as the Court has further refined the application of the Fourth
Amendment in the noncriminal context with the development of the special-needs
doctrine. 3
38
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,33 9 the Supreme Court
described the core principles of its new methodology:
[T]he permissibility of a particular practice "isjudged by balancing its intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests."
In most criminal cases, we strike this balance in favor of the procedures
described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Except in certain well-
defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it
is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. We
have recognized exceptions to this rule, however, "when 'special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable."' When faced with such special needs, we have not
332. See, e.g., Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 922 n.8.
333. See generally Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment:
An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529
(1997).
334. See infra notes 348-401 and accompanying text.
335. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
336. Id. at 532-34, 538-39.
337. See, e.g., 2 LAFAVE ET AL.,supra note 120, §3.9(d).
338. See, e.g., infra notes 369-71 and accompanying text.
339. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the
practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular
context.
34 °
Central to the special-needs analysis, then, is balancing the privacy interests at stake
against the strength of the countervailing government interest in conducting a search
outside the constraints of the Warrant Clause. In striking this balance, the Court has
moved beyond its holding in Camara to uphold warrantless and suspicionless drug
testing of railroad employees involved in train accidents, 34 1 government agents
involved in drug interdiction efforts, 342 and public school students engaged in
athletics 343 and other extracurricular activities. 344 The Court has also upheld
warrantless and suspicionless home searches conducted as a condition of probation
345
but has struck down programs requiring drug testing of candidates for state office
346
and maternity patients in a public hospital.347 While these authorities represent a
significant expansion of the state's power to conduct searches outside the traditional
requirements of a warrant and probable cause, the scope of the doctrine is nonetheless
limited in ways that evidently exclude the aggressive practices at issue in contemporary
welfare search cases.
b. A Uniquely Pedestrian "Special Need"
The special-needs calculation turns initially on the presence of a governmental
interest that is sufficiently substantial to justify the suspension of otherwise applicable
Fourth Amendment protections. 348 In the absence of such a "special need," the analysis
goes no further.349 While the Court has made "little or no effort... to explain what
these 'special needs' are," 350 inviting criticism that the term is "no more than a label
that indicates when a lax standard will apply," '351 the practical application of the
340. Id. at 619 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,654 (1979); Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)) (citations omitted).
341. Id. at618-33.
342. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666-77 (1989).
343. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-66 (1995).
344. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,828-38 (2002) (upholding mandatory drug testing
for all students participating in competitive extracurricular activities).
345. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-80 (1987).
346. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-23 (1997).
347. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76-86 (2001).
348. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318 (stating that a special need "must be substantial-important
enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest [and] sufficiently vital to
suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion").
349. Id.; see, e.g., 19 Solid Waste Dep't Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068,
1072 (10th Cir. 1998).
350. William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment,
44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 554 (1992).
351. Id.; see also Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee's DNA a Valid Special Needs
Search Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 34 J.L.
MED. & ETmcs 165, 170 (2006).
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doctrine has been limited to two relatively discrete sets of circumstances.352 At least in
the estimation of the Court itself, these circumstances constitute a "closely guarded
category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches."
353
First, the Court has utilized the special-needs doctrine to justify suspicionless search
practices that purport to promote public safety. Cases involving this form of
governmental interest include decisions upholding suspicionless drug testing of
railroad employees and customs agents as well as suspicionless home searches of
probationers. 354 In striking down a drug-testing program directed at candidates for
public office, the Court focused on the absence of any credible public-safety objective
as pivotal to its conclusion: "[W]here, as in this case, public safety is not genuinely in
jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how
conveniently arranged.,
355
Second, and relatedly, the Court has applied the special-needs doctrine when the
state purports to act in loco parentis to protect the health and safety of public
schoolchildren under its supervision. 356 In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and
Board of Education v. Earls, the Court upheld broad, suspicionless drug-testing
programs of public school students on the dual grounds that drug abuse poses a
substantial public health risk and that the state is uniquely empowered in its role as
guardian of schoolchildren to act outside the normal constraints of the Fourth
Amendment. 357 As Justice Scalia noted in Vernonia,
We caution against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass
constitutional muster in other contexts. The most significant element in this case is
the first we discussed: that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the
government's responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor
of children entrusted to its care.
358
352. See infra notes 354-58 and accompanying text.
353. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309.
354. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (referring to
"surpassing safety interests"); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,674
(1989) (referring to "extraordinary safety and national security hazards"); Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) (referring to the community's safety from harm by the "probationer's
being at large").
355. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323; see, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836-37
(2002).
356. Earls, 536 U.S. at 836-37; Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-57
(1995); cf New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351-53 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
357. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829-30; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-55.
358. 515 U.S. at 665. In addition to these two primary areas of application, the special-needs
doctrine and related variants have been employed to uphold warrantless and suspicionless
searches for purposes of conducting drunk-driving and immigration inspections at automobile
checkpoints, Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448-55 (1990), United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-67 (1976), and to investigate potential employee
misconduct within a government workplace, O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,725-26 (1987)
(plurality opinion). Notably, the Court has limited the application of the doctrine in the context
of automobile checkpoints to the detection of actively intoxicated drivers and barred its
application in circumstances where the police search instead for potential intoxicants not yet
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The welfare searches at issue here are not related to either the state's interest in
public safety or its special responsibility to schoolchildren in its custody and care.
They are instead expressly designed to advance a need that is not special in any
relevant respect: the government's mundane administrative interest in the fiscal
integrity of a benefits program.359 While the scope of the special-needs doctrine is
subject to considerable confusion,360 no credible characterization of its existing reach
supports the proposition that an interest "so generalized and ever-present" '361 would be
sufficient, standing alone, to trigger its application. To the contrary, as the Court
underscored in Chandler v. Miller,362 the requisite need must be "sufficiently vital to
suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion. 363
Evidently recognizing that the interest at stake bears no relation to the class of
special needs supporting suspicionless searches, the courts in Sanchez, Whitburn, and
Smith simply ignore the content of the doctrine. The court in Smith thus declares
without citation that "[t]he governmental interest in reducing welfare fraud is great"
and concludes on that basis that a sufficiently compelling interest is present.3 64 Taking
a different approach, the district court in Sanchez fills the analytic gap by conflating its
special-needs analysis with the irreconcilable reasoning of Wyman.365 Citing Wyman
for the proposition that the government "has appropriate and paramount interest and
concern in seeing and assuring that the intended and proper objects of... [welfare]
assistance are the ones who benefit from the aid it dispenses,' 366 the court concludes as
a "consequen[ce]" that San Diego County "has a 'special need' in ensuring that scarce
public resources, intended for the benefit of needy children, are not wrongly consumed
by those ineligible for such aid. 367 The Seventh Circuit in Whitburn makes the
identical argument. 368 Wyman, however, is not a reflection of the special-needs
consumed: "Only with respect to a smaller class of offenses, however, is society confronted with
the type of immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb that the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz
was designed to eliminate." City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000).
359. See, e.g., Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting from denial of en banc review) (describing the state's "general
interest" in preventing fraud).
360. Maclin, supra note 351, at 170.
361. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
362. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
363. Id. at 318; see also Maclin, supra note 351, at 176 ("Chandler appears to have 'raised
the bar' on the threshold requirement for a special needs search.").
364. Smith v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712 (Ct. App. 2002).
365. See infra notes 369-71 and accompanying text.
366. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, No. 00CV1467JM(JFS), 2003 WL 25655642, at *6
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2003) (quoting Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,318-19 (1971)) (emphasis
omitted). Wyman's actual analysis of the government's rationale involves consideration of a
variety of additional factors that the Sanchez court ignores. See supra notes 260-331 and
accompanying text.
367. Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *6. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding on grounds
that "the underlying purpose of the home visits is to verify eligibility... and not for general law
enforcement purposes," Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2006),
thus expanding the special-needs doctrine to include all searches conducted for purposes
unrelated to law enforcement-in defiance of Chandler's holding and admonition, supra notes
353-63 and accompanying text, which the Sanchez majority ignored.
368. See S.L. v. Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299, 1310 (7th Cir. 1995) (relying on the same language
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doctrine but instead a departure from it.36 9 In particular, the government rationale
recognized in Wyman as supporting the reasonableness of the home visit is
irreconcilable with the interests that the Court has subsequently found to justify a
special-needs search. 370 By grafting Wyman's inapposite reasoning upon the special-
needs analysis, the courts in Sanchez and Whitburn manufacture a rationale for the
challenged searches that defies the governing doctrine.
371
c. A Uniquely Compelling Privacy Interest
After considering the strength of the government's rationale, the special-needs
inquiry next weighs the countervailing privacy interest. 372 The privacy interest at issue
here is "the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth
Amendment protection." 373 Authorities are legion supporting the proposition that "the
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home"374 define the "zenith" of
constitutionally protected zones of privacy.375 As the Court recently noted, "We have
in Wyman to uphold Milwaukee's home-search program).
369. See, e.g., Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 966 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc review) ("[A]llowing Wyman to constrict
the bounds of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ignores over thirty-five years of intervening
law."); Michael D. Socha, An Analysis of Michigan's Plan for Suspicionless Drug Testing of
Welfare Recipients Under the Fourth Amendment "Special Needs " Exception, 47 WAYNE L.
REv. 1099, 1117 (2001) (" Wyman is a case decided in 1971, eighteen years before Skinner and
Von Raab .... The Supreme Court developed a separate and distinct line of reasoning and
precedent for dealing with blanket, suspicionless drug testing subsequent to Wyman.").
370. See supra notes 354-63 and accompanying text; see also Marchwinski v. Howard, 113
F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1143 (E.D. Mich. 2000) ("To the extent that Wyman could be construed as
allowing [searches outside the scope of the discussion in Chandler], its holding is no longer
viable."), rev'd, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), vacatedby an equally divideden banc court, 60
F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the Wyman rationale relied upon by the Sanchez and
Whitburn courts was only one of several-including, notably, rehabilitation-that the Court
considered in combination to reach its reasonableness conclusion. See supra notes 262-331 and
accompanying text. The absence of those other moderating objectives suggests that, even under
Wyman, the referenced rationale would be insufficient to independently establish the
reasonableness of contemporary search programs.
371. Cf Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143 ("Even if Wyman did support [suspicionless
drug testing of welfare recipients], it would not be sustainable in light of the more recent
Chandler [decision].").
372. Almost all of the major special-needs cases have addressed some form of suspicionless
drug testing. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826-27 (2002); Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70-73 (2001); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1997);
Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650-51 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 608-12 (1989); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660-63 (1989). In assessing the gravity of these intrusions, the Court has
focused on the particular methods employed in the testing programs and the degree to which the
subjects are assured privacy in providing test samples. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-32; Ferguson,
532 U.S. at 78; Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658-60; Skinner, 489 U.S. at
626-27; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671-72.
373. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976).
374. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980).
375. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
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... lived our whole national history with an understanding of 'the ancient adage that a
man's house is his castle .... ,,,376 The state's corresponding obligation to respect the
home's "well-being, tranquility, and privacy" is an interest "of the highest order in a
free and civilized society.
' 37 7
Contemporary welfare search practices entail highly intrusive inspections of the
most intimate and private spaces within an applicant's home.378 In some programs, the
scope of the inspection is committed to the discretion of the investigator and is thus
unlimited in any articulated respect.379 In view of the highly protected status of the
home, the severity of the potential intrusion upon it, and the pedestrian nature of the
government's general interest in confirming eligibility for a public-benefits program, it
strains credulity to suggest that the special-needs calculation might possibly permit
such practices.
This conclusion is bolstered by the single case in which the Court has upheld a
special-needs home search.38 ° In Griffin v. Wisconsin,38' the Court ruled that the state
could condition probation upon a requirement that officers be allowed to conduct
warrantless searches of a probationer's home if "reasonable grounds" exist to suspect
the presence of contraband.382 The Court acknowledged that "[a] probationer's home,
like anyone else's, is protected by the Fourth Amendment[], '3 s3 but that probationers
have a significantly diminished expectation of privacy based on their highly supervised
status. 384 The Court stressed that probationers "do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, but only.. . conditional liberty properly dependent on
observance of special [probation] restrictions.' 38 5 As the Court later explained, "the
legitimacy of certain privacy expectations vis-A-vis the State may depend upon the
individual's legal relationship with the State." 386 Elaborating on this principle, lower
courts have permitted special-needs searches ofparolees' homes387 but have prohibited
warrantless home searches as a condition of release for pretrial detainees,388 stressing
dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing); see supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
376. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006) (quoting Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301, 307 (1958)).
377. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,471 (1980).
378. See supra notes 227-34, 247 and accompanying text.
379. See, e.g., Sanchez v. County of San Diego, No. OOCV1467JM(JFS), 2003 WL
25655642, at *8 n.8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2003), aff'd, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006); cf Smith v.
L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 704 (Ct. App. 2002) (scope of search is
limited).
380. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 940 n. Il (9th Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J.,
dissenting) ("Griffin appears to be the only case in which 'special needs' permitted a warrantless
entry and search of anyone's home.").
381. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
382. Id. at 872-73.
383. Id. at 873.
384. Id. at 874-75.
385. Id. at 874 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)) (alterations in
original).
386. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995).
387. See, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 404 F.3d 1238, 1241-44 (10th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Lewis, 71 F.3d 358, 361-62 (10th Cir. 1995).
388. See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2005).
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that "pretrial releasees are ordinary people who have been accused of a crime but are
presumed innocent." 3
8 9
The contrast between the privacy expectation in Griffin and the interest at stake in
contemporary welfare searches is apparent. In Griffin, the authorized search-based,
notably, on reasonable suspicion-targeted the home of a convicted felon under the
continuing supervision of the state penal authority.390 In contrast, the challenged
welfare inspections target the homes of individuals who have committed no crime,
present no threat to public safety, and have no special "legal relationship" with the
state apart from their commonplace status as applicants for a public benefit.391 As
Judge Fisher noted in his Sanchez dissent, "unlike convicted felons, welfare applicants
have no lesser expectation of privacy in their homes than the rest of us....
[Applicants] have committed no wrong and [the welfare authorities] have all but
disclaimed any rehabilitative or supervisory purpose .,,392 The distinction is especially
conspicuous in light of the fact that the Ninth Circuit has elsewhere refused to permit
pretrial searches of the homes of the criminally accused on grounds that they "have
suffered no judicial abridgment of their constitutional rights. 393 As Judge Fisher
observed, Sanchez thus establishes that "those in need of public assistance to provide
food, shelter and medical care for themselves and their families have less protection
under the Fourth Amendment than those charged with a crime.
394
In defending the improbable assertion that the challenged searches implicate an
insubstantial privacy expectation, the courts in Sanchez, Whitburn, and Smith resort
again to the inapposite authority of Wyman and to distortions of the controlling
doctrine. Citing Griffin for the general proposition that "a person's relationship with
the state can reduce that person's expectation of privacy even within the sanctity of the
home"395-yet ignoring Griffin's radically different facts and analysis 39 6-the Ninth
Circuit in Sanchez cursorily asserts that "it is reasonable for welfare applicants who
desire direct cash governmental aid to undergo eligibility verification through home
visits."397 Citing Wyman, the court in Whitburn declares that welfare applicants
necessarily must have a diminished privacy expectation in view of the benefits they
389. Id. at 871.
390. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874-75.
391. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 941 (9th Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J.,
dissenting) ("With the exception of convicted felons, neither we nor the Supreme Court has ever
held that an individual's privacy expectation in the home was reduced to a level of
unreasonableness as a result of their relationship with the state.").
392. Id. at 940.
393. Scott, 450 F.3d at 872.
394. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 944 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
395. Id. at 927.
396. See supra notes 382-85 and accompanying text; cf Sanchez v. County of San Diego,
483 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing)
("Comparison to Wyman and the more recent line of special needs cases reveals the utterly
unreasonable nature of this search program. The facts of Sanchez place the panel majority's
ruling in new and untenable territory.").
397. Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 927; see also Sanchez v. County of San Diego, No.
OOCVI467JM(JFS), 2003 WL 25655642, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2003). The Sanchez court
also argues that the searches are consensual and thus even less invasive of privacy. The assertion
is in considerable tension with the facts. See supra notes 107, 257.
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seek to obtain.39 s The court in Smith, also in reliance on Wyman, similarly concludes
that "the home visit program [does not] impose a substantial intrusion into personal
privacy.
' 399
The difference between aid applicants and convicted criminals is hardly elusive.
The contrary assertion-that a request for public benefits triggers a sufficiently
debasing legal relationship with the state to open medicine cabinets and dresser
drawers for a suspicionless special-needs inspection-is inimical to any tenable
characterization of the law.400 As one recent commentary noted, "Every citizen is in a
'relationship' with the government, and fraud abounds in all governmental programs.
What will distinguish this case from the case in which investigators want to rummage
through drawers in citizens' homes to 'prevent' tax fraud? ' 4° 1 The answer, evidently, is
the relative wealth of those seeking the Fourth Amendment's protections.
C. Making Sense of Nonsense: The Poor as a Subconstitutional Class
I mean, you walk in andyou see the $5000 widescreen TV, and the person says,
"oh, I have all this trouble supporting my children 'cause I don 't have a man to
help me in the house, "and there's obviously a man to help her in the house-and
that's seeing if the charity is going where it's supposed to go.... And you open a
closet and you see four suits... and thejolif clubs of the person that doesn't live
there, supposedly--same thing, isn't it?
- Judge Andrew Kleinfeld, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
during oral argument in Sanchez v. County of San Diego
When a federal judge adjudicating the privacy rights of aid applicants suggests that
the question plausibly turns on the prospect of welfare recipients cashing government
checks to help cover the cost of greens fees, business attire, and in-home theatre
systems, the reality ofjudicial bias is apparent. Judge Kleinfeld's remarks during oral
argument in Sanchez betray a conception of the poor that is so incuriously skewed as to
nearly defy apprehension-a world of golfing swindlers who fund their luxurious
lifestyle by misappropriating the charity of hard-working taxpayers. It is a conception
of the poor, however, that is as time-honored in American discourse as it is distorted.
The contemporary authorities sustaining aggressive welfare search practices must be
understood against this perceptual backdrop. The holdings, like the torturous reasoning
required to reach them, are so hostile to traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine that
they cannot fairly be understood as its product. The outcomes instead suggest that the
law actually matters little: the poor, presumptively different, inhabit their own
398. S.L. v. Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299, 1310 (7th Cir. 1995).
399. Smith v. L.A. County Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712 (Ct. App. 2002)
(noting that the searches at issue are scheduled within a ten-day period after intake, must
account for the applicant's work or education schedule, and are limited in scope).
400. Cf Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916, 932 (Fisher, J., dissenting) ("By suggesting that welfare
applicants may be treated the same as convicted criminals, the majority ignores the limits
implicit-and explicit-in Griffin.").
401. Constitutional Law--Fourth Amendment, supra note 257, at 2003.
402. Audio file: Oral Argument, supra note 271, at 6:06-6:47 (remarks of Kleinfeld, J.).
2010)
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
constitutional universe. The implausible implications of the holdings themselves, if
applied outside the context of the poor, demonstrate the point.
The decisions rest on two propositions. First, the courts deem the state's fiscal
interest in combating fraud and waste in the administration of a public benefits
program as sufficiently compelling to justify the suspension of traditional Fourth
Amendment protections.4 3 Second, the courts assert that applicants for such benefits
have a sufficiently diminished expectation of privacy to preclude any complaint about
the imposition of suspicionless search conditions.4 4 Consider the general application
of these assertions. With respect to the state's interest in fiscal oversight, there is no
distinction between public assistance to the poor and the myriad other state grants,
subsidies, benefits, and tax deductions that extend to nearly every person in the
nation.40 5 Necessarily, then, the holdings imply that virtually everyone is now subject
to a special-needs search within whatever zone of privacy might relate to the
verification of eligibility for the public benefit in question. (Certainly, if the home itself
is subject to inspection on these grounds, no other physical space might possibly be
exempt.) With respect to the privacy analysis, the holdings establish that a mere request
for state aid ratchets down the applicant's privacy expectation so far that virtually no
zone of privacy remains inviolate, provided that the state's intrusion reasonably relates
to eligibility verification.
The general application of this reasoning would eviscerate the Fourth Amendment,
as Judge Fisher notes in his Sanchez dissent:
The majority's conclusion . . . seems limitless and risks eroding the Fourth
Amendment rights of various groups of people in this country. The government is
a provider of countless benefits and services, many of which require verification of
eligibility-such as disability benefits, Medicare and Medicaid benefits, veterans
benefits, student financial aid grants and lunch subsidies for school students. If the
majority is correct that a person's expectation of privacy in the home is reduced
any time he or she has a relationship with the state that requires an eligibility
determination, then there seems little to prevent the government from
implementing a home visit program ... with respect to these beneficiaries as
well.406
To Judge Fisher's list might be added countless other subsidies, benefits, grants, and
tax deductions that require recipients to meet specified eligibility criteria.40 7 For
example, the rationale would permit school officials to conduct suspicionless home
searches of all students seeking to enroll in any school district that requires verification
of residency within its specified attendance boundaries. 40 8 Internal Revenue Service
403. See supra notes 364-68 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 395-99 and accompanying text.
405. Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment, supra note 257, at 2003 ("Every citizen is in
a 'relationship' with the government, and fraud abounds in all governmental programs.").
406. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 941 n.12 (9th Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J.,
dissenting).
407. See, e.g., Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing); Constitutional Law-Fourth
Amendment, supra note 257, at 2003.
408. See. e.g., Dunbar v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 2d 178, 182 (D. Conn. 2003)
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agents could likewise search the homes of all persons claiming a mortgage interest
deduction to verify that the subject property is used as a primary or secondary
residence.4°
In view of these implications, one must ask whether there is any basis to suspect that
the Fourth Amendment is at actual risk of such an improbable diminution. The
proposition receives no support from the Supreme Court's recent decisions, which have
instead "'raised the bar' on the threshold requirement for a special needs search 'Ao and
expanded the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home in other contexts. 41' Nor is
the prospect plausible as a practical matter: it defies credulity to suggest that courts
might permit every homeowner claiming the mortgage interest deduction to face a
warrantless and suspicionless home search at the hands of the Internal Revenue
Service.412 As the Supreme Court recently stressed, the Fourth Amendment must be
construed to prohibit suspicionless intrusions "from becoming a routine part of
American life. ' '4 "3
We are left, then, with the alternative explanation: the poor are simply different. The
premise is not novel. Commentators have noted for decades that American law
differentiates on the basis of class in its recognition of basic rights.414 As Julie Nice
recently observed,
[The] forces of deconstitutionalization have constructed dual rules of
constitutional law based on economic means. On one hand is the rule of law that
respects the dignity of the haves and protects rights that benefit them .... On the
other hand is the rule of law that refuses to protect rights in a manner that might
protect or benefit the have-nots. This second-class rule of law adds insult to injury
by constantly monitoring and invading the lives of the have-nots-
comprehensively scrutinizing and regulating both their work and family lives-
(noting that students "have no property right to attend school in Hamden unless they reside
within that school district"); Acalanes Union High Sch. Dist., Frequently Asked Questions
Regarding the Residency Verification Process (2009), available at http://www.acalanes.
kl2.ca.us/forms/residencyfaqs.pdf (requiring annual residency verification); Fremont Union
High Sch. Dist., New Students (2009), http://www.fuhsd.org/REGnew (requiring all new
students to verify residency); Fremont Union High Sch. Dist., Continuing Students (2009),
http://www.fiihsd.org/REGcontinue (requiring all enrolled tenth graders to verify residency); cf
Martinez ex rel. Morales v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (upholding state residency requirement
for public school attendance against equal protection challenge).
409. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7605-1 (as amended in 1993); see also Wyman v. James, 400
U.S. 309, 343 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf Burkhart, supra note 2, at 270-72 (noting
scale of homeowner subsidies).
410. Maclin, supra note 351, at 176.
411. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); see also Sanchez v. County of San
Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 941 (9th Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J., dissenting).
412. Cf Nice, supra note 2, at 656 ("Although general concern about the potential of fraud is
not a sufficient basis for invading the privacy of most Americans under the Fourth Amendment,
it has been accepted as sufficient when the home being invaded belongs to a poor mother
receiving welfare to help support her family.").
413. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,42 (2000).
414. See, e.g., Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development, and Present Status (pts. 1-3), 16 STAN. L. REv. 257 (1964), 16 STAN. L.REv. 900
(1964), and 17 STAN. L. REv. 614 (1965).
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while simultaneously denying them the 4rotection of legal rights to defend
themselves within this regulatory regime.
As Professor Nice notes, the contemporary welfare-search jurisprudence falls squarely
within this tradition.
416
While not confessing bias, the decisions at issue display it without apology or
pretense. Thus the courts in Sanchez and Whitburn-like the Supreme Court before
them in Wyman 417 -frankly embrace the stereotype of the immoral poor as a basis for
analysis. During the Sanchez oral argument, for example, Judge Kleinfeld disdains the
assertion that the state lacks sufficient interest to search the homes of all aid applicants,
citing in rebuttal the apocryphal golf clubs and $5000 television sets that await to be
found in their living rooms.418 Writing for the Seventh Circuit in Whitburn, Judge
Manion is only slightly less disdainful. To justify the state's "important interest in
seeing that the funds received by the household [are] expended for their intended
purpose," Judge Manion recounts that one plaintiff's "door was opened at about 9:30
a.m. by an adult male in his pajama bottoms" who then "shut the door in the field
representative's face," while "at least two individuals" reported that another plaintiff
had been living with her husband for some number of years.419 In a footnote, Judge
Manion acknowledges that "[iut is true that in these cases, both [plaintiffs] were able to
convince the County that they were actually eligible for public assistance. But that does
not change the fact that the County had good reasons to believe that neither applicant
was eligible for benefits. ' ' 42° He continues:
We note these facts not because we have any interest in trivializing the social,
moral, and economic difficulties that the recipients of public assistance must
confront, but rather to illustrate that the state as well as the recipient and the
caseworker 'not only [have] an interest but an obligation' to ensure proper use of
funds entrusted from the public.
421
Judge Manion declines to explain how two inflammatory anecdotes of disproven
misconduct might illustrate the state's general interest in searching the homes of aid
recipients, but the implication is clear enough. The poor live in a scandalous world of
half-dressed deadbeats and secret spouses, face a corresponding and constant
temptation to seek aid to which they are not entitled, and accordingly merit generalized
suspicion in light of the "social, moral, and economic difficulties" that plague and
corrupt their lives. It is a small step from this enduring stereotype to the otherwise
inexplicable holdings in Sanchez, Whitburn, and Smith: why should courts demand
compliance with the ordinary requirements of the Fourth Amendment when the state
seeks to search the homes of an intrinsically culpable class?
415. Nice, supra note 2, at 631 (footnotes omitted).
416. Id. at 652-55.
417. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
418. Audio file: Oral Argument, supra note 271.
419. S.L. v. Whitbum, 67 F.3d 1299, 1308 (7th Cir. 1995).
420. Id. at 1308 n.5.
421. Id. at 1308.
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CONCLUSION
In a blunt and disparaging dissent to the denial of en banc review in Sanchez, seven
circuit court judges declare that San Diego's "shameful" search program is "nothing
less than an attack on the poor ' 422 and that the panel decision upholding it "strikes an
unprecedented blow at the core of Fourth Amendment protections." 423 While the
dissenters fairly condemn Sanchez for its singular departure from settled Fourth
Amendment norms,424 their critique presumes that the comparison is germane to the
majority's analysis. Were it so, the implications of Sanchez and related authorities
would indeed be unprecedented, given the pedestrian rationale of fiscal accountability
offered in defense of the challenged intrusions. All benefit programs entail virtually
identical interests in fiscal integrity; if these common interests are "sufficiently vital"
25
to support a suspicionless home search, then the practice is necessarily unlimited in its
application to them. Considering the scale of government largesse, such an expansive
conception of the search power would render the protections of the Fourth Amendment
broadly irrelevant-a result that is irreconcilable with the rhetoric and practical reality
of current jurisprudence. 26
The implausibility of these implications demonstrates that contemporary welfare-
search decisions cannot be read within the traditional framework of the Fourth
Amendment. These are not simply badly reasoned opinions that fail to account for their
full reach, and their indifferent attempt to reconcile with prevailing doctrine is largely
beside the point. The decisions instead proceed from a different, if implicit, premise:
the poor are isolable as a subconstitutional class. Just as the Supreme Court in Wyman
departed from otherwise applicable Fourth Amendment principles to craft and cabin a
search doctrine for the poor alone, so too the contemporary decisions upholding
aggressive welfare -search practices operate outside governing precedent to inflict their
special burdens on a single class of litigants.
The judicial bias giving rise to this divided doctrine reflects a deeply rooted and
enduring conception of the poor as morally bereft. The premise has animated public
discourse since the European settlement of North America and served to exclude the
poor from equal participation in our civic life for over two centuries. It has particularly
direct application in the context of the Fourth Amendment's right to domestic privacy,
which broadly limits the state's power to intrude within the home absent cause to
422. Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing).
423. Id. at 966. In addition to the seven judges joining in Judge Pregerson's dissent, Judge
Alex Kozinski dissented separately. See id. at 969 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of en
banc rehearing).
424. See id. at 965-69 (Pregerson, J., dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing).
425. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).
426. Id. at 318-22; see supra notes 348-58; Sanchez, 483 F.3d at 969 (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting from denial of en banc rehearing) ("[W]e do not require similar intrusions into the
homes and lives of others who receive government entitlements. The government does not
search through the closets and medicine cabinets of farmers receiving subsidies. They do not dig
through the laundry baskets and garbage pails of real estate developers or radio broadcasters.
The overwhelming majority of recipients of government benefits are not the poor, and yet this is
the group we require to sacrifice their dignity and their right to privacy.").
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suspect wrongdoing. By imputing to impoverished parents an innate risk of
misconduct, in keeping with the abiding stereotype of the immoral poor, Sanchez and
related authorities accept indigency as a surrogate for the individualized suspicion that
otherwise would be required to justify the intrusions at issue. Once poverty is
understood to necessarily imply some form of moral culpability, courts may then use it
as a proxy for cause in authorizing state agents to indiscriminately rifle through the
medicine cabinets, dresser drawers, and bedroom closets of all indigent aid applicants.
While any jurisprudence sanctioning such conduct is indeed "an assault on our
country's poor,''427 contemporary welfare-search decisions continue in a long tradition
of judicial bias directed at the indigent. The archaic premise of the dissolute poor
remains alive and well in American law, and we have a bifurcated Fourth Amendment
to prove its enduring vitality.
427. Sanchez, 483 F.3d at 966 (Pregerson, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc
rehearing).
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